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Litigation rates in workers' compensation systems in the United States have 
been rising over time, but relatively little is known about the characteristics of 
the injured workers and their employers that affect the probability of such liti 
gation. Our research analyzes the factors determining whether or not a case is 
litigated and, if it is, how deep into the administrative process the case 
advances. How far the case proceeds is a proxy for societal costs associated 
with use of the formal dispute resolution system. Litigation involves the filing 
of a legal claim by at least one party to a dispute and possibly further activity 
within the formal dispute resolution system. We first construct a theoretical 
model in which the expected costs and benefits of litigation affect the proba 
bility that the concerned parties (the worker or the employer/insurance com 
pany) will contest a case and the probability that they will pursue a contested 
case to verdict. This model guides our empirical work.
Empirical research examining the causes of litigation within states, with 
sufficiently detailed data to control for a variety of influential factors, is miss 
ing from the workers' compensation literature. Our analysis attempts to fill 
this void. We investigate the compensation experience of employees who sus 
tained lost-time injuries in two states, Delaware and Michigan. Both states 
earned reputations as being relatively litigious through the early 1980s, 
although under significantly different administrative structures, with an 
impairment approach in Delaware and a wage-loss approach in Michigan. We 
have two data sets from Delaware, for cases with compensated injuries origi 
nating in 1982 and in 1985. The Michigan data consist of a sample of cases 
that closed in 1986. With detailed data on worker characteristics, indemnity 
benefits received, and the nature of disputed cases, we identify factors influ 
encing the probability of a case becoming contested and factors influencing 
whether settlement of the case occurs prior to an administrative hearing. For 
Delaware, we also study the elements affecting the size of indemnity pay 
ments to injured workers in contested and uncontested cases and obtain 
insights into whether litigation substantially increases the amount collected, 
other things being equal.
Results for Delaware
After a description of the institutional arrangements and data, we present 
the estimates of the multivariate litigation model for Delaware. We first study
how the employer and the insurance type affect the probability of litigation. 
Relative to a case in which the employer is commercially insured, a workers' 
compensation injury is more likely to be contested if the employer is one of 
the (self-insured) major automakers. In the 1982 and 1985 data, no differences 
are apparent in the probability of litigation among the major chemical manu 
facturers, other self-insured employers, and commercially insured employers. 
For 1982 injuries, cases where the employer is self-insured and in the public 
sector are also equally likely to be contested as when the employer is commer 
cially insured. For 1985 injuries, such cases are less likely to be contested than 
those in which the employer is commercially insured.
Industry of employment affects litigation behavior in Delaware. Litigation 
probabilities are higher in manufacturing and construction than in services. 
Notably, these three industries account for about 60 percent of the injury 
claims in Delaware. Our model predicts that the shift of employment in recent 
years away from manufacturing and construction and towards services will 
result in lower future litigation probabilities.
The probability of litigation increases with a worker's age up to a maxi 
mum and decreases with age thereafter. We predict that the expected increase 
in the average age of the workforce in the coming decades will result in initial 
increases in litigation probabilities, but that those probabilities will eventually 
fall as the workforce continues to age.
A worker's wage has no effect on the litigation probability in 1982 (a reces 
sion year) but is negatively associated with the litigation probability in 1985 (a 
period of economic expansion). We interpret this result in terms of the chang 
ing opportunity costs of litigation over different phases of the business cycle.
The part of the body injured and the type of injury are significant determi 
nants of the probability of litigation. In both years, back, shoulder, and knee as 
well as multiple-part injuries, significantly increase the probability of a case 
being contested. These are injuries where the existence of pain and the extent 
of the recovery following some period of recuperation are often difficult to 
ascertain objectively.
Similarly, the decision to pursue a case to verdict depends on the part of the 
body injured and on the type of injury. In 1985, a case was more likely to have 
been pursued to verdict when the employer was a major automaker. As with 
the decision to contest, pursued cases tend to be those involving injuries that 
are the most difficult to evaluate.
Indemnity payments to injured workers are related to a number of factors. 
Wages, type of injury, body part injured, type of employer, industry, and loca 
tion of employment are associated with indemnity payments.
Insights can be gained about the efficiency of the Delaware workers' com 
pensation system by examining predictions made using the estimated payment
equations. We predict the cumulative payments to the typical nonlitigant if he/ 
she would have litigated the case. We also predict payments had litigants not 
litigated their cases. From these predictions, we conclude that if individuals 
who did not contest their cases had done so, the litigation outcome would have 
resulted in smaller gains than those accruing to people who actually litigated 
their cases. In addition, our model predicts that litigants, even had they not 
disputed their cases, would have received higher payments than workers 
observed not to contest their injury. These predictions provide evidence that 
the dispute resolution system in Delaware sorts cases efficiently.
Results for Michigan
We also estimate the determinants of the probability cf litigation and of 
pursuing a litigated a case to verdict for Michigan. This is particularly relevant 
for comparison with our Delaware results. Since the Michigan data set 
includes compensated and uncompensated cases, while the Delaware data 
only include the former, some of the models for Michigan are estimated with 
the sample consisting of compensated cases only. This approach allows for 
easier comparison of the Michigan results with those obtained for Delaware.
Big Three automakers show a greater likelihood of litigation than other 
types of employers when compensated and uncompensated cases are included 
in the sample; however, the difference disappears when the sample is limited 
to compensated cases. This result is consistent with the argument that litiga 
tion surrounding Big Three cases is more heavily involved with determining 
whether or not a case is compensable.
In Michigan, cases in which the employer is commercially insured are 
more likely to be contested than other cases except those involving the major 
automakers. In Delaware, cases in which the employer is commercially 
insured are equally likely to be contested as cases in which the employer is a 
self-insured private sector firm. The exception is the major automakers. A 
plausible explanation of this difference arises from the ways commercial 
workers' compensation insurance prices are regulated in the two states: Dela 
ware imposes a price floor on insurance premiums, while Michigan does not. 
Insurance premiums in Michigan were regulated prior to the early 1980s. 
Beginning in 1981, a series of reforms ultimately led to open competition 
among insurance companies in Michigan, where insurance companies are free 
to compete with each other on price. In Delaware, insurance companies can 
not offer discounts to employers with above-average safety records within a 
class of employers engaged in the same line of business. In effect, the rate reg-
ulation in Delaware results in very safe workplaces subsidizing less safe work 
places. This incomplete experience rating of workers' compensation insurance 
policies in Delaware may well explain the apparent difference in behavior of 
insurers in Michigan, where insurance premiums are more closely related to 
employer claims.
The next question involves the complexity (i.e., whether the case is pursued 
to verdict) of litigated cases in Michigan. That is, we are not only interested in 
the initiation but in the continuation of litigation. We estimate the effect of 
employer and injured worker characteristics on the probability of whether a 
case is taken to a decision or to an appeal. Cases in which the employer is a 
Big Three automaker are more likely to be contested, and when litigation 
takes place, they are also more likely to go further into the workers' compensa 
tion litigation process. For the probability of litigation, we find this outcome 
only when all cases (including uncompensated ones) are included. The result 
suggests that, when the employer is a Big Three automaker, the most hotly 
fought cases are those involving compensability of the injury. The probability 
that a contested case is pursued to verdict also depends on the worker's age 






For over a decade, rising litigation rates in workers' compensation 
systems in the United States have prompted calls for statutory reform. 
The growth in disputes significantly contributed to the rising total costs 
of job-related injuries nationally during the 1980s. However, litigation 
frequency and costs have varied widely across the nation. Some states, 
such as Wisconsin, have a relatively low proportion of cases involved 
in formal dispute resolution. At the other extreme is California, where 
litigation costs totaled $2.2 billion in 1992 and have increased by over 
50 percent every two years since 1984 (California Workers' Compen 
sation Institute 1993).
Although litigation has been blamed for rising workers' compensa 
tion premiums, there has been little empirical research into the factors 
that influence the decision by workers or by their employers to litigate. 
The following chapters offer an econometric analysis of dispute resolu 
tion within workers' compensation programs in Delaware and Michigan.
Workers' compensation statutes in Delaware have been the repeated 
target of criticism from both business and labor leaders during the last 
decade. The system is allegedly slow in paying benefits to injured 
workers, quick to involve attorneys, and expensive for employers liable 
for injury costs. However, as was true in many jurisdictions, the state 
lacked a suitable data base for determining the validity of these allega 
tions, relative to the average experience in other states. In 1987, a data 
base was constructed at the University of Delaware as part of a grant 
from the state to correct this deficiency. The data base provided a pro 
file of the compensation experience of all Delaware workers (and their 
employers) with lost-time injuries during 1982 (Staten and Link 1988). 
Five years of experience (through 1987) were incorporated into the 
data base during our original study in 1988.
A grant from the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 
provided the resources for updating the 1982 file by adding the com 
pensation history for each case through mid-1990. Also, the grant sup 
ported the creation of a second Delaware data file based on 
compensable lost-time injuries that occurred in 1985. Like the 1982 
data, the cases in the 1985 file have been followed through mid-1990.
One of the main objectives of our research is to analyze the factors 
influencing whether a case is litigated and, if litigated, how far into the
2 Introduction
legal process the case goes. Litigation involves the filing of a legal 
claim by at least one party to a dispute and possibly further activity 
within the formal dispute resolution system. The empirical model cap 
tures the impact of the economic incentives that affect the decisions of 
both employees and employers to contest workers' compensation 
claims. The model incorporates the petitioner's options of either drop 
ping or settling a dispute with the other party or of taking the case to a 
formal hearing.
These issues are examined with the Delaware data as well as with 
data provided by the Upjohn Institute, derived from a sample of more 
than six thousand workers' compensation cases in Michigan that were 
closed in 1986. The Michigan data provide an opportunity for evaluat 
ing the empirical model's applicability to other states.
Both data sets are used to address questions such as the following:
1. What factors determine the probability that a claim will be con 
tested?
2. Why are some contested claims dropped or settled prior to a for 
mal administrative hearing?
3. How are the dollar amounts of compensation influenced by a 
decision to settle versus a decision to continue to pursue a case 
through the dispute resolution system?
4. What impact does the type of insurance (commercially purchased 
versus self-insured) have on the decision to litigate?
Chapter 1 introduces the reader to the litigation problem in workers' 
compensation programs. The chapter discusses how litigation has esca 
lated within a system that was originally intended to reduce the courts' 
involvement in the compensation process. Chapter 2 summarizes the 
components of the Delaware data base and describes the characteristics 
and compensation experience of workers injured during 1982 and 1985 
through a series of bivariate tables. The conceptual model of dispute 
resolution is described in chapter 3. This model is the basis for the 
econometric estimates for Delaware injuries presented in chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 applies the model to analyze the determinants.of litigation in 
Michigan, based on a sample of cases closed during 1986. Our conclu 




At the beginning of the twentieth century, industrial accidents were 
frequent. 1 In the days before public assistance programs provided a 
social safety net, injured workers suffered prolonged and severe 
income interruptions. Although the tort system was available for recov 
ering damages from employers, workers found that, in many cases, 
employer negligence, necessary for establishing employer liability for 
the costs of an injury, was difficult to prove in court. Jury awards in 
favor of injured plaintiffs were haphazard, varied substantially in size, 
and almost always involved delays of many months between the time 
of injury and receipt of payment (Berkowitz and Berkowitz 1985).
In response to these conditions, workers' compensation laws were 
enacted in the majority of state legislatures between 1911 and 1920. 
Workers' compensation was conceived as a social insurance program 
that would preempt reliance on the legal tort system for handling dis 
putes over job-related injuries. Reformers fashioned a "no-fault" sys 
tem of compensation to injured workers that assigned strict liability to 
employers for the costs of job-related injuries. Strict liability is where 
there is no requirement for proof of negligence to establish liability. 
Through this approach, benefits were provided to all injured workers, 
without requiring a determination of fault. However, all workers were 
required to accept workers' compensation benefits as their exclusive 
remedy. Thus, a quid pro quo emerged. Workers received the guarantee 
of certain and timely compensation (in the form of income replacement 
plus medical costs) for their injuries on the job, without having to dem 
onstrate employer negligence. In return, the statutes limited an 
employer's liability for injury costs to maximum amounts of compen 
sation, removing the threat of larger jury awards. In principle, legal dis 
putes over culpability were legislated out of the industrial accident 
arena.
However, time has proved the reformers too optimistic in the hope 
that the workers' compensation program would prove to be largely
4 Workers' Compensation and Market Efficiency
self-administering. To some degree, litigation has been part of the sys 
tem since its inception. To qualify for workers' compensation, an 
injury must be shown to be job related, thereby opening the door to dis 
pute. Moreover, many jurisdictions link the payment of indemnity ben 
efits to an assessment of physical impairment, which may also be 
disputed. According to estimates from the National Council on Com 
pensation Insurance (NCCI), 23 percent of all 1984 claims for perma 
nent partial disability were represented by an attorney. However, 
litigation rates varied widely across states. For example, the 1984 
NCCI report noted that 47 percent of permanent partial claimants in 
Illinois hired an attorney but that only 9 percent of such claimants were 
represented by an attorney in Wisconsin (NCCI 1984).
In some states, the rate and, more importantly, the cost of contested 
cases grew dramatically between 1970 and 1990. In terms of absolute 
dollars, California's experience is by far the worst. In 1990, 45 percent 
of all workers' compensation indemnity cases in California were liti 
gated, and 62 percent of these litigated cases involved disputes over the 
existence and extent of permanent disability (California Workers' 
Compensation Institute 1991, p. 2). More importantly, the California 
Workers' Compensation Institute estimates that the annual cost of 
workers' compensation litigation in that state increased from $240 mil 
lion in 1981 to $1.5 billion in 1990. In contrast, the number of injuries 
resulting in lost time of one day or more increased by only 15 percent 
during the same period.
Standards for Measuring the Impact of Litigation 
on Program Effectiveness
The reformers who drafted the initial workers' compensation stat 
utes early in the twentieth century were primarily concerned with 
income maintenance and fairness. The imposition of strict liability 
reflects the overwhelming judgment that a compensation system rely 
ing on the courts for awarding benefits would not accomplish these 
goals. Thus, it is reasonable to question the extent to which litigation 
within the workers' compensation system has compromised the pro 
gram's effectiveness.
Workers' Compensation and Market Efficiency 5
To clarify analysis of the "litigation problem" it is necessary first to 
define precisely the criteria used to evaluate the effectiveness of a 
workers' compensation program. The original concerns of reformers 
regarding benefit adequacy and equity have persisted over time. Con 
gress formed the National Commission on State Workmen's Compen 
sation Laws (1972) to evaluate the degree of income replacement 
provided by the network of state workers' compensation laws. In 
developing a lengthy list of recommendations for state legislatures, the 
National Commission defined and applied adequacy and equity stan 
dards for evaluating a workers' compensation system. Benefits paid 
and services provided under a workers' compensation program were 
adequate if they were sufficient to meet the objectives of providing 
substantial protection against interruption of income. 2 An equitable 
system was defined by the National Commission as "delivering bene 
fits and services fairly as judged by the program's consistency in pro 
viding equal benefits or services to workers in identical circumstances 
and its rationality in providing benefits and services in proportion to 
the impairment or disability for those with different degrees of loss." 3
Two other evaluative criteria established by the National Commis 
sion are directly impacted by litigation. Injuries impose a cost on work 
ers, on firms, and on society as a whole in that there is a reduction in 
the capacity for producing goods and services. Thus, an important 
dimension of any method of transferring income to injured workers is 
the program's impact on safety, i.e., its effect on the incentives of both 
the employer and the employee to reduce the probability of accidents.
Still another area of concern recognized by the National Commis 
sion involves the administrative costs required to deliver benefits to 
injured workers. Ideally, benefits of a given quality would be delivered 
at the lowest possible administrative cost. 4 Of course, a major compo 
nent of these costs (summed across all parties involved) is the "fric- 
tional costs" associated with resolving disputes.
One way of evaluating the burden imposed by litigation is to con 
sider the dollars that injured workers receive (as indemnity benefits, 
medical treatment, or rehabilitation) as a proportion of the total dollars 
paid by employers in the form of awards (indemnity, medical, rehabili 
tation) plus litigation costs. Measured in this way, California's perfor 
mance over the past two decades highlights the drag imposed by the 
growth in administration costs. In 1978, employers paid 32 cents in
6 Workers' Compensation and Market Efficiency
legal costs for each dollar of benefits delivered to injured workers. By 
1992, 78 cents in litigation expenses were paid by employers for each 
dollar awarded. Clearly, workers received a declining share of the total 
costs incurred by employers for injuries. A report from the California 
Workers' Compensation Institute found that "in 1978, employees 
received 76 cents of each dollar that employers paid for litigation plus 
awards, while attorneys received 13 cents and forensic physicians 
received eight cents. By 1992, those proportions shifted dramatically, 
with the injured worker being the big loser. In 1992, injured workers 
received only 56 cents of each dollar paid by employers for litigation 
and awards, while the forensic physicians' share tripled to 24 cents and 
the attorneys' share increased slightly to 17 cents" (California Work 
ers' Compensation Institute 1993, p. 4).
It is conceptually helpful to combine the separate but related goals 
of safety and streamlined administrative costs under an umbrella con 
cept termed the efficiency of the workers' compensation program. Effi 
ciency is a concept that economists routinely apply in evaluating the 
performance of markets. Simply put, an efficient mechanism for orga 
nizing the production and distribution of goods and services is one that 
maximizes the value of the things we, as a society, can produce with 
our scarce resources.
While the efficiency of a workers' compensation system may have 
been recognized as an important consideration by the early reformers, 
the importance of efficiency has been substantially elevated over the 
past two decades. In large part, this is due to a growing body of eco 
nomic analysis that has empirically quantified the effects of workers' 
compensation programs on safety incentives, injury rates, worker pro 
ductivity, total labor costs, and the hiring/location decisions of firms. 
Discussions of empirical evidence on these issues can be found in Che- 
lius (1977, 1983), Butler and Worrall (1985), and Worrall and Butler 
(1988).
Economic research has forced workers' compensation policy makers 
to recognize the trade-offs between competing goals of adequacy, 
equity, and efficiency. For example, raising weekly compensation pay 
ments to enhance benefit adequacy has been shown to lead to more 
reported injuries and more time off the job. On the other hand, 
restricted coverage of certain types of injuries or occupational diseases, 
in the interest of economizing on administrative costs and total com-
Workers' Compensation and Market Efficiency 7
pensation payments, can reduce employers' incentives to prevent acci 
dents.
Perhaps the best way to illustrate the concept of efficiency and 
related trade-offs is in the context of a simple model of the economics 
of job safety. Workers' compensation plays an important role in deter 
mining the amount of job safety that will be produced and conse 
quently, the efficiency of the production of goods and services. Thus, 
the administrative rules established by a state to determine and deliver 
workers' compensation also influence the efficiency of production. The 
following section makes the concept of efficiency, and the trade-offs 
between safety and streamlined administration, more concrete by 
inserting workers' compensation into a simple model of the economics 
of job safety.
Workers© Compensation and the Economics of Job Safety
We must begin with an idea of what constitutes the most desirable or 
optimal amount of safety. 5 Like any economic good, an increase in 
workplace safety, measured in terms of a reduction in the probability of 
injury, involves higher production costs. Of course, the safest (zero- 
risk) work environment would involve no human contact at all, but 
reducing labor involvement requires that greater quantities of other 
resources be substituted in order to manufacture the final product. This 
defines the terms of the trade-off. We can achieve more safety if we are 
willing to make do with less of other things. The higher costs of safer 
working conditions are reflected in a higher product price. The eco 
nomically efficient amount of safety is the level that maximizes the 
subjective value that we collectively place on safety plus all the other 
goods and services we consume for a given expenditure.
Under certain conditions, a free market is capable of providing the 
optimal amount of safety without government regulation. To see this, 
begin by imagining a world, long since past, of strict caveat emptor in 
regard to employer-employee obligations in the event of industrial 
accidents. That is, the firm bears no legal liability for job hazards. In 
such a world, would a firm have any financial incentive to prevent acci 
dents? The answer is yes, and under certain (restrictive) conditions, a
8 Workers' Compensation and Market Efficiency
firm might bear all of the costs of worker injuries. Assume a competi 
tive labor market in which employers vie for qualified workers. Lost- 
time accidents impose costs on employers in several ways. At the most 
fundamental level, even minor accidents disrupt a worker's productiv 
ity. Injuries that require recovery time away from the job deny the firm 
the output that the worker would have contributed. Interviewing, hir 
ing, and training replacements impose additional costs. So, even with 
out liability to compensate the injured worker, the firm bears some 
costs of the accident.
Hazardous worksites impose other, potentially greater costs on a 
firm. Assume that workers, over time, become fully informed about the 
working conditions and relative risk of job sites. In a competitive labor 
market, workers will demand and employers must pay compensating 
wage differentials for riskier jobs. Risk-neutral workers who are fully 
informed will demand extra compensation equal to the expected costs 
associated with the risk of injury in particular jobs (risk-averse workers 
will demand compensation in excess of expected injury costs). Higher 
wages for riskier jobs force firms to "internalize" the expected injury 
costs. That is, firms will consider these costs along with all other pro 
duction costs when making choices about the amount of output to pro 
duce and the mix of inputs to employ.
Employers will typically choose from a variety of options for reduc 
ing the expected costs of worker injuries. A firm might automate pro 
duction in order to use less labor and thus incur less risk of injury. 
Alternatively, a business might find that installation of safety features 
or procedures may reduce the risk of injury and lower the compensat 
ing wage differential demanded by workers. The point is that a firm in 
such a market will prevent accidents when prevention is cheaper than 
paying higher wages to workers to cover the expected costs of injuries. 
The business bears all of the costs of industrial accidents, and such 
costs are reflected in the price of the final product. Wealth-maximizing 
firms in such competitive markets will produce the optimal amount of 
final product and job safety.
Of course, the real world is not so neatly defined. Optimal produc 
tion of safety in the "let-the-worker-beware" system described depends 
critically on workers who are sufficiently informed about job hazards 
to demand higher wages and are sufficiently mobile to incur no costs of 
switching jobs. Otherwise, the firm faces less market pressure to pay
Workers' Compensation and Market Efficiency 9
compensating differentials and has a reduced incentive to prevent acci 
dents. Consequently, some of the costs of production remain "external" 
to the firm; workers (and society) incur the costs, but the firm does not. 
More of the final output is produced and sold at a lower price than 
would occur if the firm internalized the injury costs. Less safety is pro 
duced than would be true if the firm fully compensated injured work 
ers.
Given this less-than-perfect result in a less-than-ideal world, a case 
can be made for government intervention in the marketplace. The most 
fundamental form of intervention is the establishment of property 
rights on behalf of workers that impose liability on employers for inju 
ries resulting from job-site hazards. In principle, the firm's legal liabil 
ity for injuries at least partially replaced compensating wage 
differentials as the mechanism forcing it to internalize injury costs. 
When liable for accident compensation, a wealth-maximizing firm 
would incorporate into its decisionmaking the expected costs to be 
paid when an injured worker sues for damages; this would occur just as 
surely as if the firm were paying higher wages for riskier jobs.
However, prior to the early twentieth century, when the tort system 
was the legal remedy for injured workers in the United States, the 
plaintiff (worker) was required to demonstrate some degree of negli 
gence on the part of the employer. As discussed, the difficulty of estab 
lishing employer negligence caused awards to vary substantially above 
and below the actual costs incurred by the injured worker and resulted 
in considerable uncertainty regarding the probability of recovering any 
settlement at all. From the standpoint of economic efficiency, the 
advantage of workers' compensation programs was in the strict liabil 
ity provisions. The greatly increased probability of having to compen 
sate injured workers required firms to internalize injury costs far more 
reliably than when payment was subject to the vagaries of the courts. 6
The extent of the employer's liability for the cost of injuries should 
be reflected in accident rates. States that require larger compensation 
payments to injured workers should experience lower injury rates, 
other things being equal. Interestingly, empirical studies that have 
related differences in workers' compensation benefit rates across states 
to differences in injury rates often reveal a positive association. How 
ever, this is not because higher benefits have somehow compromised 
safety, nor is it likely due to greater risk taking by workers. Instead,
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most studies that relate accident rates to benefit levels have focused on 
nonfatal injuries, for which a significant moral hazard effect exists. 
That is, workers receiving more generous benefits are more likely to 
report injuries and to claim that injuries occurring off the job were 
actually job-related (Smith 1990). Also, returning to work after an 
injury is less attractive when benefits are higher. One recent study esti 
mates that the time off the job increases by 3 percent for each 10 per 
cent increase in workers' compensation benefits (Viscusi 1991, p. 78).
Clearly, incentives matter when considering the impact of workers' 
compensation programs on both employer and employee behavior. The 
NCCI has estimated that, from 1978 to 1988, workers' compensation 
premiums increased by 48.4 percent due to benefit changes, and by an 
additional 30.1 percent due to changes in worker behavior arising from 
the altered benefit structure (Viscusi 1991, p. 78).
The question posed earlier remains, however: what impact have ben 
efit levels had on the employer's incentive to prevent accidents? By 
focusing on work-related fatalities in order to eliminate the moral haz 
ard problems, empirical studies have shown that, in the absence of 
workers' compensation, the risk of job-related fatalities in the United 
States would be 20-27 percent higher than current levels. This result 
validates the prediction that (strict) liability for injury costs imposed by 
workers' compensation does promote investment in safety (Moore and 
Viscusi 1990) and the efficient production of goods and services.
How does litigation influence efficiency? The impact derives from 
two separate but related effects. First, the friction imposed by litigation 
drains scarce resources from other employment as they are used to 
resolve disputes. Consequently, as litigation costs rise, other things 
held constant, society has less overall output available for consump 
tion.
This is not to say that all litigation is undesirable, for disputes do 
arise and resolution is necessary to achieve the desired level of safety. 
Recall that to be eligible for workers' compensation, an individual 
must demonstrate an injury to be work-related; this claim is a potential 
source of dispute. Also, criteria for determining the amount of indem 
nity compensation may require judgments about physical impairment, 
the potential loss of use of body parts and systems, or the loss of wage- 
earning capacity, all of which create an incentive for workers to over 
state and for employers to understate the degree of injury. To the extent
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that a state's administrative rules create these incentives, efficiency 
requires some form of litigation to bring actual compensation as close 
to the true cost of injury as the statutes allow.
Certainly, as discussed in the economic model of job safety, as the 
costs of dispute resolution rise, other things will not remain constant. 
Litigation costs resemble a tax on labor, effectively increasing the price 
of labor relative to other inputs that might be used in the production 
process. Over time, a wealth-maximizing firm experiencing rising 
workers' compensation costs will reduce its reliance on labor in favor 
of other, relatively less costly, inputs. The incentive to avoid the "litiga 
tion tax" will be greatest for the types of jobs that most frequently gen 
erate disputes over injuries. The substitution incentive is operative at 
all times but will have different impacts across states, depending upon 
whether the state's administrative framework promotes or deters dis 
putes.
Consequently, the second effect of rising costs of litigation may be a 
distortion of safety incentives, leading to the overproduction of safety 
and underproduction of other goods and services. Injuries will likely be 
reduced over time for two reasons. Firms will invest in equipment, 
training, and procedures to lower the probability of injuries that spawn 
litigated claims. Alternatively, firms may simply cut back employment 
(to achieve less exposure) in risky jobs. In other words, workers' com 
pensation statutes can cause the market to generate too little employ 
ment in some occupations, because the cost of resolving injury 
disputes inflates the cost of labor and distorts the safety incentives. On 
the other hand, attempts to rein in litigation costs by limiting coverage 
of controversial types of injuries run the risk of compromising (sacri 
ficing) the deterrent function that workers' compensation serves when 
it links the cost of injury to the party generating the risk.
What Causes Disputes?
Disputes arise if there is doubt that the injury is job-related. Dis 
putes also arise when the extent of disability is difficult to measure, 
since total compensation payments are typically a function of time off
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the job or reduced earnings capacity. These two broad categories of 
issues constitute the large majority of all litigation. 7
How does the administrative structure of a workers' compensation 
system influence the number of disputes? Perhaps the best illustration 
is in the context of the rules for compensating permanent disability. 
Although only about 20-25 percent of all work-related injuries in the 
United States involve a permanent disability, payments to these work 
ers accounted for 65 percent of all indemnity benefits in 1982 
(Berkowitz and Burton 1987, p. 38). The various state jurisdictions are 
not uniform in defining precisely the objectives of their provisions for 
compensating permanent disabilities. Consequently, the costs of per 
manent partial disability as well as the frequency of disputes vary 
widely across states.
Some terminology is helpful for understanding the issues. 
Berkowitz and Burton (1987, chapter 1) define impairment and 
disability as the two concepts fundamental to the theory of 
compensating permanent disabilities. Impairment refers to anatomical, 
physiological, intellectual, or emotional abnormality or loss resulting 
from an injury. In contrast, a disability is "the inability or limitations in 
performing social roles and activities such as in relation to work, 
family, or to independent community living" (Berkowitz and Burton 
1987, pp. 6-9). They distinguish conceptually between two types of 
disability, work and nonwork. A work disability involves the loss of 
actual earnings or earnings capability as a consequence of impairment. 
A nonwork disability involves limitations in performing social roles 
and activities, as a result of impairment.
Which type of disabilities are workers' compensation laws intended 
to compensate? The answer is not clear-cut. However, according to 
Berkowitz and Burton, the National Commission on State Workmen's 
Compensation Laws (1972) concluded that one of the basic objectives 
of a modern workers' compensation program is the substantial protec 
tion against loss of income. Consequently, workers' compensation ben 
efit payments should be tied to the extent of work disability. 
Nevertheless, some states accommodate nonwork limitations in their 
calculations of permanent partial benefits, widening the potential area 
for dispute.
Even confining the calculations to work disability leaves the issue of 
determining compensation far from settled. The problem is that work
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disability is difficult to measure. "The extent of a worker's disability 
depends not only on the extent of his or her functional limitations but 
also on other influences. For example, the loss of actual earnings or 
decrease in earnings capacity (work disability) depends not just on 
functional limitations, but on the worker's personal characteristics 
(age, education, experience, and other factors), the labor market condi 
tions in which he must compete for employment, and the sources of 
assistance available to him" (Berkowitz and Burton 1987, p. 9).
Almost all states tackle the problem of measuring lost earnings 
capacity by evaluating impairments, as an observable proxy for the 
degree of work disability. Some states, such as Delaware, also make 
payments for the impairment itself, independent of its impact on earn 
ings. However, the decision about the amount of permanent partial 
benefits to be paid is typically made after the medical condition has 
stabilized but before most or all of the actual wage loss for which the 
benefits are intended occurs. In short, "permanent partial benefits are 
largely based on proxies for the expected wage los*s that are assessed 
on an ex ante basis, before the wage loss actually occurs" (Burton 
1983, p. 27).
By definition, estimates of lost wages will be subjective and, conse 
quently, disputable. This feature of permanent partial disability com 
pensation is at the root of the litigation problem. States vary 
substantially with respect to the guidelines adopted for estimating lost 
wages but generally may be sorted into three categories. In one cate 
gory are states that base estimates of permanent disability solely on 
impairment ratings. The second category includes states that attempt to 
estimate lost earnings capacity. The third, a small group of states, uses 
the actual wage loss to determine benefits. These approaches, along 
with the administrative framework set up to oversee the system, 
heavily influence the frequency of litigation. 8
We have found the workers' compensation literature to be lacking in 
empirical work that examines the reasons for litigation within state 
jurisdictions and that has adequate data to control for various influ 
ences. The analysis provided in the following chapters makes such a 
contribution. We investigate the compensation experience of workers 
who had lost-time injuries in Delaware and Michigan. Both states were 
considered to be relatively litigious through the early 1980s, although 
under markedly different administrative structures, with an impairment
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approach in Delaware and a wage-loss approach in Michigan. Using 
detailed information on worker characteristics, indemnity benefits 
received, and the nature of disputed cases, we identify factors that 
affect the probability of a case becoming contested and those factors 
influencing whether the case is settled prior to an administrative hear 
ing. For Delaware, we also examine the factors that underlie the size of 
indemnity payments to injured workers in contested and uncontested 
cases, to determine whether litigation substantially increases the 
amount collected, other things remaining equal.
NOTES
1. "Industrial accident rates reached their all-time peak in the first decade of this century. In 
1907 over 7,000 workers were killed in just two industries, railroading and coal mining" 
(Berkowitz and Burton 1987, p. 17).
2. It is typical today for state compensation laws to require that medical costs be paid in full 
and that injured workers be compensated for lost wages at a rate equal to two-thirds of their gross 
weekly wage, subject to a statewide maximum. Workers' compensation benefits are not taxable. 
Viscusi and Moore (1987) estimate that, nationwide, the average wage replacement rate for 
injured workers is 55 percent of income before taxes and represents 83 percent of after-tax 
income.
3. For further discussion of alternative definitions of equitable benefits, see Burton and 
Berkowitz (1987), pp. 25-28.
4. Berkowitz and Burton (1987, p. 27) refer to this concept as "panoramic efficiency."
5. For an excellent discussion of social policy toward job safety and the economics of avail 
able policy tools, see Smith (1976).
6. Since indemnity payments do not necessarily fully replace lost wages for injured workers, 
some degree of compensating wage differentials remains in the labor market. The limited liability 
imposed by workers' compensation statutes has prevented the sort of escalation in punitive dam 
ages imposed on firms by the courts in product liability suits.
7. For example, in California during 1992, disputes over permanent disability accounted for 
35 percent of all litigation costs for employers and employees. Disputes over causation accounted 
for another 31 percent of all litigation costs. All other sources of disputes comprised the remaining 
third (California Workers' Compensation Institute 1993, p. 8).
8. For an interesting contrast of two approaches with strikingly different litigation rates within 
one state, see Boden (1988).
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The Delaware Data
and Characteristics of the
Workers© Compensation System
By 1980, several years of spiraling medical fees and larger benefit 
payouts to injured workers had caused a dramatic increase in workers' 
compensation costs to Delaware firms. At the same time, the adminis 
trative system for resolving disputes over appropriate benefits was 
experiencing a growing judicial backlog of cases awaiting review. To 
address these problems, a major legislative "reform" effort was 
mounted in 1981. However, the ensuing debate suffered noticeably 
from the lack of a data base to support detailed analysis of the state's 
prior experience. The reform attempt was unsuccessful.
Motivated in part by the empirical shortcomings of the 1981 reform 
effort, Staten and Link (1988) constructed a comprehensive data base 
for the State of Delaware that described the experience of injured 
workers within its workers' compensation system. The data base uti 
lized information from the Delaware Department of Labor's Division 
of Industrial Affairs (DIA) to follow compensation claims to their final 
resolution. The history of compensation payments, including size and 
timing, as well as the sequence and extent of litigation, was incorpo 
rated.
An augmented version of this data base serves as the foundation for 
the empirical work in the following chapters. To strengthen the analy 
sis and to assess the influence of the business cycle on compensation 
experience, the same types of data were collected for injuries to work 
ers during 1985. This chapter describes the construction and contents 
of the data base. Included is a description of the relevant Delaware 
compensation statutes and administrative practices along with a variety 
of tables providing a detailed picture of how the Delaware system 
operated for workers with lost-time injuries during 1982 and 1985.
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Construction of the Data Base
A description of the Delaware workers' compensation system 
involves more than a study of injury patterns across workers and indus 
tries. Since the purpose of this study is to investigate the determinants 
of workers' compensation benefits, and whether they are received with 
or without formal litigation, it is necessary to observe an injured 
worker's entire case history.
Given the need to see complete case histories, there are two strate 
gies for assembling data sets that have been employed in studies of 
compensation programs in other states. One approach is to select cases 
for workers injured at the same point in time. The injured workers in 
the sample would have a common injury year, but there would be vari 
ation with respect to the time elapsed until final resolution of their 
cases. The second approach takes a sample of cases with a common 
ending date (closed case files). Cases in this approach begin at different 
points in time but are closed (i.e., concluded) in the same period.
There are advantages and disadvantages to each approach.' Selec 
tion of cases with a common beginning guarantees that injured workers 
all experience the same economic climate and other external factors 
that could influence experience with the compensation system. Work 
ers injured in the same time period also deal with the same compensa 
tion system in the sense that any statutory or administrative changes 
will alter the rules they all must face.
The disadvantage of selecting a sample based on a common begin 
ning is that to get a complete history on all cases, one must wait until 
the last case is concluded. This can involve a very long wait, which 
means using cases that opened several years earlier than the time when 
the study is conducted. Of course, the more time has elapsed between 
the date of the injury and the present, the more likely it is that changes 
have occurred that make conclusions less relevant for the current sys 
tem.
The approach based on a common closing date suffers from the 
same drawback, although to a lesser extent. To illustrate, if we look at 
cases all of which closed in 1986 (which we will do for Michigan in 
chapter 5), we will find some very recent injuries, as well as injuries 
that occurred at different points in the past. Of course, the most com-
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plicated injuries involving protracted disputes will be older cases, 
which are likely to be least relevant to the current institutional charac 
teristics of the workers' compensation system.
Another factor dilutes the advantage gained by looking at the entire 
history of each closed case. Because a survey of closed cases involves 
cases with different dates of origin, it is harder to distinguish the influ 
ence of the compensation system from the influence of distinctive eco 
nomic conditions and other factors arising from various starting dates. 
Hunt (1982) notes that in the closed case design, relative to a common 
beginning date design, cases of extremely long duration tend to be 
underrepresented.
For the Delaware data base, cases were selected based on a common 
year of injury. Data track the events following each injury, including 
how long it takes for benefits to begin, the size and duration of com 
pensation payments, and whether litigation was involved at any stage. 
Cases were selected for all workers injured during 1982. In the earlier 
project for the State of Delaware (Staten and Link 1988), the data were 
collected from computer files maintained by the DIA at the end of Feb 
ruary 1987, reflecting four to five years of experience. These files were 
updated to incorporate activity as of mid-1990.
As of February 1987, 90 percent of the 1982 cases were closed. In 
other words, 90 percent of injured workers eligible for compensation 
benefits had received all of their benefits by this time. Although about 
10 percent were still classified as open cases, we determined that most 
of these were undisputed and simply receiving ongoing weekly com 
pensation payments as part of extended or permanent total disability. 
By mid-1990, based on the sample used for the econometric models in 
chapter 4, 94 percent of the cases were officially closed. Moreover, of 
those cases not officially closed, most of them were effectively closed, 
although the records of the Delaware Industrial Accident Board (IAB) 
did not yet reflect this fact. 2 For the 1985 data, similar checks indicate 
that about 94 percent of the cases were officially closed and that some 
of the cases officially open were effectively closed. 3
Thus, the patterns discussed in this report are based on observation 
of the entire case history for all but a small fraction of Delaware cases. 
The proportions of 1982 and 1985 cases officially listed as closed as of 
May 1990 are similar, even though three additional years elapsed since 
the time of the earlier injuries. This similarity reflects the fact that the
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IAB probably improved its recordkeeping over time. In particular, for 
many of the cases officially listed as open, the only missing item was 
the letter of receipt of the final payment. It appears that, in a number of 
cases, such a letter was written but not recorded by the IAB. Appar 
ently, recording receipt of the letter took place for a higher number of 
cases for the more recent injuries.
Of course, eight (five) years had passed between the time a worker 
was injured in 1982 (1985) and the time the DIA files were tapped to 
build the data set. How much of that experience with the compensation 
system is relevant for today's injured worker? Delaware's system 
changed very little between 1982 and 1990, with no significant legis 
lated modifications to the basic statutes. The number and type of inju 
ries may be somewhat different today, due to Delaware's changing 
employment base, as reflected in the rapid growth of the financial sec 
tor and by shrinking employment in the chemical industry. Neverthe 
less, these workers face exactly the same legal constraints and 
incentives for obtaining compensation benefits as did their counterparts 
in 1982.
It should be noted that the 1982 and 1985 data bases provide a com 
parative description of the experience of carrier-insured and self- 
insured employers. We are aware of no research, aside from Hunt 
(1982), that has utilized data to contrast the experience of carrier- 
insured and self-insured employers. Although several national studies 
of benefit delivery have been done, they typically utilize data derived 
from one of the national rating bureaus supported by the compensation 
insurance industry. Commercial insurance carriers routinely provide 
claim and loss data to such rating bureaus, in order to support the actu 
arial rating services upon which most state insurance rates are based. 
Consequently, the rating bureaus have the same type of data that we 
have collected for all injuries covered by commercially purchased 
workers' compensation insurance. 4 However, the rating bureaus typi 
cally do not have any information on self-insurers or their loss experi 
ence. Self-insurers are usually the largest employers in a state, with a 
significant proportion of both the workforce and compensation experi 
ence. Our data set allows us to examine their experience and to contrast 
it with that of employers insured by commercial carriers.
A second point about the data should also be emphasized. Because 
Delaware is a relatively small state, it was possible to examine the
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entire universe of cases for both years, rather than selecting a sample. 
This eliminates problems of potential sampling bias that studies of 
more populous states must confront. For purposes of estimating regres 
sions in chapter 4, we eliminated observations for which there were 
missing data on any of the independent variables. Our data file for 
1982 consists of 3,951 of the population of 4,025 cases considered 
compensable lost-time injuries, more than 98 percent of the popula 
tion. The data file tracking 1985 injuries comprised 4,328 of 4,466 lost- 
time compensable injuries, 96.9 percent of the population of lost-time 
compensable injuries.
Information for each injury in the DIA computer files was contained 
in several different types of files. In constructing the data base for this 
study, we merged demographic information about injured workers and 
characteristics of their employers with information on the levels of 
indemnity (i.e., cash) payments they received for their injuries. Addi 
tional information that described any disputes resulting in formal liti 
gation was also matched to each worker's case.
Potential Limitations of the Data Base
It is appropriate here to note several limitations of the data. The two 
data bases constructed for this research consist of all lost-time injuries 
that occurred during the years of 1982 and 1985, respectively. Due to 
data storage constraints, the Delaware DIA does not maintain the com 
puterized record of an injury for more than two years from the date of 
occurrence, unless it results in lost time or a petition is filed requesting 
the IAB to resolve a dispute arising from the case. Only lost-time or 
disputed injuries from 1982 were still available in the data base when 
the information was originally extracted for this project in 1987. The 
same is true of the 1985 data base extracted in mid-1990. Of course, 
these lost-time cases are precisely the ones a workers' compensation 
system is created to handle. However, it does mean that any statements 
made about injury patterns for 1982 must be limited to those resulting 
in lost time.
Note also that we have only limited data on lost-time injuries that 
were judged not to be compensable. Consequently, we cannot address
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disputes involving whether an injury was job related. The data proba 
bly contain some cases that were disputed on those grounds, but only if 
they were ultimately compensable. Missing are those lost-time injuries 
alleged to be job related but that were never compensated. 5
All employers or their insurers are required by law to report injuries 
and the amount of indemnity compensation to the Delaware DIA. 
However, they do not report medical payments or the legal costs 
incurred by the employer associated with dispute resolution by the 
IAB. Consequently, we do not have data on either of these costs on a 
case-by-case basis.
This does not mean that the 1982 data set gives us no insight into the 
costs of disputes. Although we do not have data on legal costs in dol 
lars, we do have detailed information on the number and type of formal 
events (e.g., pretrial conference, IAB hearing) associated with each 
disputed case. We distinguish between cases based on the complexity 
of the dispute, as measured by the number of formal legal actions 
taken. If we associate greater complexity of a case with higher legal 
costs, then we can determine roughly which .disputed cases were more 
expensive for firms to resolve.
An additional potential limitation of the data may particularly affect 
the reported cumulative indemnity payments to injured workers. In 
both the 1982 and 1985 data, we know the cumulative payments up to 
either the time a case was closed or May 1990 (the end of the observa 
tion period). Some cases were still open as of May 1990, and we only 
observe cumulative total payments as of that date. As a result, some 
workers received payments beyond that date, and we do not know 
these additional amounts. In statistical terminology, this is called "right 
censoring" of the payment data. How severe is this right censoring? 
This is important to ascertain because in chapter 4, we study the deter 
minants of payments to injured workers, and we would like to know 
whether our results are likely to be affected.
The 1982 data consist of 3,951 cases for which we have complete 
information on certain characteristics of injured workers and their 
employers. As of May 1990, 3,705 (93.8 percent) had been closed, and 
payments had stopped. Open cases included 246 observations, of 
which 128 were contested and 118 were uncontested. Only 24 con 
tested cases involved a change in expenditures between February 1987 
and May 1990, and of these, 18 cases involved minor injuries (e.g., a
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scratched finger). 6 Uncontested cases included only one (a minor 
injury) that involved a change in expenditures in 1987-90. According 
to the IAB, most of these 246 open cases were effectively closed, 
although the Delaware IAB records did not yet reflect this fact. It 
appears that 24 cases were likely to have continued to receive pay 
ments after May 1990, and only 5 of these involved significant 
amounts. 7 In any event, for the 1982 data, significant right censoring is 
likely to be a problem for less than 1 percent of the cumulative pay 
ments that we are able to observe.
In 1985, out of 4,328 cases for which we have complete information 
on characteristics of workers and their employers, 281 were listed as 
open as of May 1990. 8 Of the 281 open (or possibly open) cases, 71 
were uncontested and involved minor injuries, and an additional 22 
were contested but involved minor injuries and had had no activity 
since 1987. There is a good chance, therefore, that these 93 (=71+22) 
cases were closed, but this fact had not been recorded as of May 1990. 
This leaves 188 open cases, 4.57 percent of all 1985 cases, for which 
right censoring may be important.
In the 1982 Delaware data, the proportion of cases with significant 
right censoring of cumulative payments to injured workers is very 
small. In the 1985 data, the proportion of cases with significant right 
censoring is larger but still modest. It may well be, however, that those 
cases that are still open eight or five years after the injury are those 
with the most severe injuries, which may involve disproportionately 
high payments compared to other cases. In view of the extremely small 
proportion of 1982 open cases, it is not likely that right censoring is 
serious for the 1982 data. Thus, right censoring may be more serious 
for the 1985 payment data but probably is still not a drastic problem. 9 
We do caution the reader that the results of our study of payments to 
injured workers may be more reliable with the 1982 data than with the 
1985 data.
The following sections provide an overview of the experience of 
Delaware workers who were injured in 1982 and 1985. We begin with 
information describing the institutional characteristics of the Delaware 
workers' compensation system, including procedures for contesting a 
claim. Subsequent sections discuss some important demographic char 
acteristics of the injured workforce, the delivery of benefits (how much 
was received), and the litigation experience of the group.
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Workers© Compensation Law In Delaware
Structure of Benefits
Delaware law provides several basic types of indemnity compensa 
tion for nonfatal injuries. Workers receive temporary total disability 
compensation while they are off the job recovering from injury. In 
addition, the law provides for permanency and/or disfigurement awards 
to workers who suffer permanent impairment, loss of body function or 
serious disfigurement. Finally, awards are payable to victims of ampu 
tation and/or total loss of designated body parts according to a sched 
ule specified in the Delaware workers' compensation law. Injury 
reports and compensation payments are processed by the DIA, within 
the Delaware Department of Labor.
Virtually all indemnity compensation in Delaware is tied to a base 
rate, payable weekly, which is a function of the injured worker's 
weekly wage. The law provides that the compensation rate be equal to 
two-thirds of the worker's weekly wage rate, up to a maximum set at 
two-thirds of the State Average Weekly Wage (SAWW). The compen 
sation rate can be no less than one-third of the SAWW, provided that 
this does not exceed the worker's wage, in which case the worker 
receives his or her wage. During a post-injury recovery period, workers 
receive temporary total compensation for each week they are off the 
job. Thus, workers who earn less than the SAWW have two-thirds of 
their weekly wages replaced by workers' compensation. Workers who 
earn more than the SAWW have a lower replacement rate. Workers 
who earn less than half the SAWW have a higher replacement rate. 10
Temporary total disability benefits are discontinued when the 
employee is able to return to the job. As was noted earlier, if the worker 
has a permanent impairment as a result of the injury, he or she is eligi 
ble for reimbursement in the form of permanency awards, defined as a 
proportion of the maximum scheduled benefits awarded for entire loss 
of the affected part of the body.'' The important point to note is that 
this proportion is likely to be the basis of a case being litigated. Dela 
ware law also provides for up to 150 weeks of compensation payable 
as a disfigurement award to any worker who suffers visible scarring
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from injuries. The percentage (of 150 weeks) to be awarded for disfig 
urement is also subject to disagreement.
Resolution of Disputes
All workers' compensation indemnity payments in Delaware are 
made under an "agreement system." According to Delaware law, if an 
employer contests an employee's claim for compensation, no indem 
nity payments need be made to the worker until the dispute is resolved. 
Of course, once the dispute is settled, payments are calculated retroac 
tive to the date that both parties agree the employee became eligible for 
compensation.
If the employer and employee do not agree on the amount of com 
pensation due, each party has the right to petition the IAB for a formal 
review of the case. This petition effectively invokes the formal dispute 
resolution process, which we shall hereafter refer to as litigation. To be 
specific, we define a dispute to be any issue that prompted either the 
employer or the employee to file a petition for a formal hearing before 
the IAB.
During the period of our analysis, the IAB consisted of five mem 
bers, each appointed by the governor to serve a six-year term. The 
decisions made by the board (two board members constitute a quorum) 
are binding upon the litigating parties, although claimants have the 
right to appeal board decisions to the Delaware Superior Court. A sub 
sequent appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court is also possible. Both 
employer and employee have the right to be represented by legal coun 
sel in all phases of the review process.
After a petition is filed, the disputing parties may conduct a series of 
pretrial conferences and hearings, prior to the formal IAB hearing. The 
initially scheduled hearing is often postponed, so that the time between 
petition and hearing ranges from several weeks to several years. Settle 
ment of the dispute may occur at any time prior to the IAB hearing. In 
such cases, details of the settlement are communicated to the IAB, and, 
subject to the board's approval, the hearing date is canceled. Alterna 
tively, the party filing the petition may choose to drop the dispute. 
Sometimes this is formally communicated to the IAB and posted in the 
case record. In other instances, cases are withdrawn de facto through 
lack of any formal activity subsequent to the petition.
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A case is considered closed by the DIA if all agreements to compen 
sate a worker have been fulfilled and the worker has signed a receipt to 
that effect. Open cases are basically those for which an agreement to 
compensate was made by the employer, but for which the DIA has not 
obtained the final signed receipt of payments. This could be either 
because weekly compensation payments are still ongoing or because 
all payments have been made and the receipt has not yet been signed 
by the employee.
According to Delaware law, an employee has five years from the 
date of last activity on a compensable lost-time injury to petition for a 
change or addition to compensation. Typically, the five-year period 
begins on the day the employee signs a receipt for the last agreed-upon 
compensation payment. Eligibility for further compensation in connec 
tion with an injury and the employer's liability expire at the end of the 
five-year period. Naturally, employers have an incentive to collect a 
signed receipt as soon as the last agreed-upon payment is made, in 
order to close the case and to begin the five-year clock that limits their 
liability.
Type of Dispute
We now address the type of dispute in the Delaware workers' com 
pensation system. Delaware law defines a dispute to be any issue that 
prompted either the employer or the employee to file a petition for a 
formal hearing before the IAB. Such a petition invokes the formal dis 
pute resolution mechanism provided under the Delaware workers' 
compensation statutes. Accordingly, the number of disputes exactly 
equals the number of formal petitions filed on each case. 12
At this juncture, it is useful to summarize some key findings by 
Staten and Link (1988) regarding disputes originating from 1982 inju 
ries. Just over one-third of all disputed cases involved two or more dis 
puted issues (see table 2.1). 13 The private sector, self-insured firms had 
a significantly higher percentage of cases that generated only one peti 
tion, relative to self-insured employers in the public sector and com 
mercially insured employers. This could be indicative of different 
strategies employed by these employers in arriving at their agreements 
to compensate. Alternatively, differences across the respective 
employee groups could account for the contrast in numbers of peti-
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tions. Later in the chapter, we will return to the variations across the 
employer groups with respect to litigation.
Table 2.1 Disputes per Injury by Type of Insurer, Delaware Data, 1982
Number of
disputes per Total Public Private Commercial Unknown 














































































NOTE: Numbers in parentheses represent percentages of column totals. Percentages may not
sum to 100 due to rounding.
a. This total reflects the number of 1982 injuries for which formal litigation was initiated.
Table 2.2 groups the frequencies for 1982 disputes according to the 
classification scheme used by the DIA. A brief explanation of the cate 
gories will be helpful for interpreting the data in the tables.
Some petitions are almost always filed by employees. Other 
requests originate with employers, and still others are filed by either 
party. Of all petitions originating with employees, table 2.2 shows that 
petitions to "determine compensation due" are the most frequent. 
Although not shown in the table, about one-third of the original peti 
tions for 1982 injury cases (i.e., those representing the first petition 
filed in connection with an injury) were filed to "determine compensa 
tion due." 14 About 57 percent of petitions filed by employees to deter 
mine compensation due were filed within six months of the date of 
injury. Petitions arising because an employer and employee cannot
Table 2.2 Timing of Litigation by Type of Dispute, Delaware Data, 1982
Type of petition
Time between injury 
and petition
Less than 5 weeks
5-14 weeks
15-25 weeks


































































































































































NOTE: Numbers in parentheses represent percentages of column totals. Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
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agree upon compensation for permanent disability would fall into this 
category. Delaware law creates the potential for disputes because it vir 
tually guarantees that a permanency or disfigurement award will be 
based on an estimate of the worker's loss as of one point in time, rather 
than on the actual loss experience as it occurs over time. When an 
employee and employer fail to agree upon the extent of the permanent 
damage, the employee may file a petition requesting the IAB to deter 
mine compensation due. Disputes over "disfigurement compensation" 
are similar but are classified separately.
The second category in table 2.2 is similar to the first, except that it 
is filed on behalf of a deceased employee's estate. These cases are 
infrequent, because they can only result from the small number of 
work-related fatalities each year.
A third employee-originated action involves requests to "determine 
additional compensation due." These disputes generally involve inju 
ries with permanent partial impairment and disfigurement. Cases 
involving petitions for additional compensation tend to be somewhat 
more complicated than those in other categories; such cases typically 
result when an injured employee has a recurrence of an injury or 
believes that a previous permanent partial award was based on an 
incorrect estimate of impairment. For 1982 injuries, petitions to deter 
mine additional compensation due and petitions for disfigurement 
awards accounted for 26.5 and 9.8 percent, respectively, of all original 
petitions. Over 70 percent of these petitions were filed more than one 
year after the date of injury.
Two categories of petitions are listed in table 2.2 as "employer 
actions." The first involves a petition to "terminate benefits." At the risk 
of oversimplifying, these cases can be further subdivided into those 
that involve only administrative housekeeping and those with an ongo 
ing dispute over compensation. An employer will frequently file a peti 
tion to terminate a worker's benefits because the last compensation 
check associated with an agreement has been sent but the employee has 
failed to sign the receipt that allows the employer to close the case for 
mally. In such situations, there is no current dispute because all com 
pensation to which both the employer and employee agreed has been 
delivered. 15 However, the collection of the receipt is an important 
administrative chore for the employer, because the statute of limita 
tions on further liability for the injury does not begin until the case is
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closed. Thus, failure to obtain a receipt projects the employer's liability 
for additional payments on the injury further into the future. Delaware 
law requires that the employer must either obtain a signed receipt or 
obtain the lAB's approval before it can close the case. Consequently, 
when the receipt is not forthcoming from the worker, the employer 
takes the alternate route of litigation.
More serious disputes prompting a request to terminate benefits 
involve cases in which the employer asserts that the employee has 
recovered sufficiently to return to work but the employee refuses to do 
so. Another possible source of dispute includes cases of "displaced 
workers" with skills so specialized that, when injury prevents them 
from returning to their old jobs, no job with close to the same wage is 
available. In such a case, the employee may contend that weekly bene 
fits should continue. If employers disagree, they may file a petition in 
this category. Petitions to terminate benefits accounted for 19.6 percent 
of all petitions connected with 1982 injuries.
An interesting feature of Delaware law is that, when a petition is 
filed to terminate a worker's benefits, the IAB assumes the obligation 
to continue making the weekly compensation payments to the worker 
until the board resolves the issue at a hearing. Benefits are paid out of 
the IAB Second Injury and Contingency Fund, which is financed 
through an annual assessment on all commercial insurance carriers and 
self-insurers operating in the state. If the board finds in favor of the 
worker, then the employer, or the employer's insurer, repays the board 
for all benefits paid out during the interim period. On the other hand, if 
the board rules in favor of the employer, the worker keeps the benefits 
received during the time the issue was being decided. The longer it 
takes to resolve such an issue, the more an employee collects, thus cre 
ating an incentive for employees and their attorneys to utilize delaying 
tactics. This is not a problem when the employee is deserving of bene 
fits, but, in cases where the board rules no compensation is warranted, 
successful delaying tactics on the part of employees and their lawyers 
may be profitable to them but costly to the state.
The second type of employer-initiated action is a petition to deter 
mine whether an injury may be considered as a "second injury" under 
state law. An employer is not liable for payment of compensation if a 
subsequent injury is connected to a previous work-related injury to a 
worker. Instead, payments to the worker are made out of the IAB Sec-
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ond Injury and Contingency Fund. The purpose of this provision of the 
law is to give employers an incentive to hire workers who have been 
previously injured.
The last two categories of petitions in table 2.2 may be filed by 
either injured workers or by their employers. One involves a request to 
compute and pay the "lump sum" value of what would otherwise be a 
stream of weekly benefit payments. The final category is a catchall of 
other types of disputes. Often these involve issues parallel to those 
raised in connection with a previously filed petition, and so they repre 
sent more complicated cases.
Finally, table 2.2 indicates that the bulk of litigation does not surface 
until long after the injury occurs. For 1982 injuries, about 54 percent of 
all petitions were filed more than one year after the date of injury. Not 
surprisingly, petitions to determine additional compensation due take 
the longest to appear of employee-initiated actions. This finding high 
lights the need in the "open case" sample design to have enough years 
after the injury to encompass most or all of the possible events occur 
ring in complex situations.
An Empirical Overview of Litigation in 1982 and 1985
The cases in the 1982 and 1985 data bases were extracted from DIA 
computer files and updated to reflect litigation information and com 
pensation figures as of mid-1990. Unless otherwise indicated, all state 
ments regarding case status and dollars of compensation paid refer to 
the cumulative history as of that date. The data bases underlying our 
analysis include a total of 3,951 and 4,328 lost-time and compensable 
injuries occurring in 1982 and 1985, respectively.
The job-relatedness requirement for compensation is a frequent 
cause of disputes. Of those workers injured in 1982, 177 filed petitions 
to determine compensation due but did not receive any payments for 
their alleged work-related injury (see note 5). Since no data exist for 
such cases in the DIA files, we were not able to construct the variables 
required for our empirical analysis, and the cases were dropped from 
our study. The remaining discussion in this chapter focuses on the 
cases judged to involve compensable lost time.
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Litigation and Type of Insurer
One hypothesis that can be investigated with the data is that an 
employer's and, consequently, an employee's experience under Dela 
ware law will be different across the various types of insurers. The Del 
aware data provide the following general three-category breakdown for 
type of insurer: private sector self-insured, public sector self-insured, 
and commercial carrier. A list of the self-insured employers appears in 
appendix table 2.1. In our empirical analysis in chapter 4, we further 
subdivide the private self-insured category. Thus, three variables for 
self-insured include the major automakers (General Motors and 
Chrysler), the major chemical firms (DuPont and Hercules), and a cate 
gory designated as "other self-insured," thereby allowing us to test for 
differences in litigation behavior across these types of employers.
Several reasons underlie this breakdown. One is simply size differ 
ences. Typically, only larger firms with significant injury exposure can 
meet the criteria to qualify for self-insurance. By virtue of size and 
occupational mix alone, these firms will likely have different safety 
and/or rehabilitation records relative to those of smaller firms. Quite 
apart from size differences, self-insured firms will also have internal 
procedures for resolving disputes that will be different from those 
imposed on firms contracting with commercial carriers. Furthermore, 
since their injury costs are a direct function of their own experience, 
their costs will vary directly with changes in their internal procedures 
as well as with changes in Delaware law. This situation is in contrast to 
the circumstances of commercially insured firms paying premiums that 
may be experience rated to some extent but not perfectly.
We also separated the automakers and chemical firms from other 
self-insured employers. DuPont is the largest private employer in Dela 
ware and has a long-standing reputation for being safety oriented. Her 
cules was grouped with DuPont since it is the other major self-insured 
chemical firm in Delaware. The automakers are not only major 
employers in the state but are also heavily unionized, which is unusual 
in Delaware. Hunt (1982) found higher litigation probabilities in work 
ers' compensation cases involving the Big Three automakers than in 
other employers in Michigan. We wanted to test for the same phenom 
enon in Delaware, where two of the Big Three are major employers.
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Finally, private and public sector employers may behave differently 
since the latter operate in a not-for-profit environment. As for the dis 
tinction between self-insurers in the public and private sectors, we sim 
ilarly find it plausible to expect a difference in litigation behavior.
Table 2.3 shows the distribution of cases according to the type of 
insurance covering the employer and provides a further breakdown as 
to whether the case was litigated. For descriptive purposes, we have 
grouped employers into five categories. First, we distinguish between 
employers that purchase compensation insurance from commercial 
insurance carriers and employers that choose to self-insure. Then, we 
further divide the self-insured group into private or public sector (gov 
ernment agencies). 16 Private sector self-insured firms are grouped into 
three categories: automakers, chemicals manufacturers, and other firms 
(see appendix table 2.1 for a listing of the specific employers).
Table 2.3 yields some insights into the distribution of cases by type 
of insurer in Delaware as well as potential differences in litigation 
behavior between the three insurer types. The highest litigation rates 
occur in cases where the employer is one of the automakers. The data 
generally show that the propensity for litigation is higher for private 
sector self-insured firms compared to firms that insure through com 
mercial carriers. The single exception is chemicals manufacturers in 
1985. Workers' compensation cases in which the employers were pub 
lic sector self-insured agencies were more likely to be litigated than 
cases in which the employers were insured by commercial carriers in 
1982. l7 No difference is apparent in 1985 between the litigation rates in 
cases in which the employers are in the public sector and- self-insured 
or in the private sector and commercially insured.
Table 2.4 shows the litigated cases that were taken to an IAB hear 
ing and/or resulted in the claimant receiving an award payment as a 
result of the process. We refer to cases where one or more of these 
events occurred as being "pursued" as opposed to being settled or 
dropped. In 1982, between 53 and 60 percent of cases were pursued 
across the three categories of insurers. However, in 1985, this ratio 
exceeded 80 percent for cases arising in firms that were privately self- 
insured. Percentages for the other categories of insurers were between 
55 percent and 58 percent. The results in tables 2.3 and 2.4 suggest that 
private self-insured firms behave differently than other employers in 
handling litigated cases. It is important to note that this is a bivariate
Table 2.3 Litigation Status of Case by Type of Insurer, Delaware Data, 1982 and 1985
Private self-insured
Public 
self- Auto- Chemical 
Litigation status insured % a makers % a firms
Other 
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NOTE: Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding. 
a. Percentage of total for row.
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comparison. In chapter 4, this hypothesis is investigated in a multivari- 
ate framework.
Table 2.4 Cases Pursued to Verdict by Type of Insurer, Delaware Data, 
1982 and 1985
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NOTE: Numbers in parentheses represent percentages of column totals. Percentages may not
sum to 100 due to rounding.
a. Pursued means carrying a litigated case through at least one administrative hearing and/or
receiving a payment or award.
b. Percentage of total for row.
Possible events for each of the eight petition types 18 in litigated 
cases are listed in table 2.5. How complex were disputed cases? The 
data in table 2.6 provide information about the number of events as of 
mid-1990 for each of the eight categories of petition, by type of 
insurer. Our objective in tabulating the number of events by each cate 
gory of petition is to convey a sense that some cases involved several 
events and were fairly complex. Presumably, the greater the number of
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events, other factors held constant, the more costly the particular case 
would be.
In 1982, the events most frequent in the litigation process occurred 
in cases involving employee petitions for "additional compensation 
due" and "disfigurement." In fact, of the total 4,065 events in 1982, 951 
(23 percent) and 1,697 (42 percent) were associated with these two cat 
egories of petition, respectively. The figures for 1985 are 1,260 (31 per 
cent) and 1,596 (39 percent) of 4,105 events.
Although the total number of events is distributed reasonably simi 
larly to the distribution of cases by type of insurer shown in table 2.3, 
there also are some interesting differences in behavior demonstrated. 
In the injuries originating in both 1982 and 1985, cases involving 
employees of private sector self-insured firms had a disproportionate 
share of all events for that type of insurer, about 24 percent, involving 
employee petitions for "determining compensation due." A similar, but 
smaller, difference is apparent for events relating to all other types of 
petitions except "additional compensation due" and for "second 
injury" in both years as well as for fatality benefits in 1985. This rein 
forces our feeling that self-insured private sector firms behave differ 
ently than other employers in administering claims related to workers' 
compensation.
Although we cannot, at this point, calculate the expected gain to tak 
ing the dispute through each stage of litigation, we can get a rough idea 
of how total compensation payments are associated with litigation. 
Table 2.7 describes the sets of 1982 and 1985 injury cases in terms of 
the average total weekly compensation for temporary total disability, 
while table 2.8 does the same for total indemnity (weekly compensa 
tion plus permanency award plus disfigurement). The tables divide 
cases according to whether any litigation was involved. The striking 
feature of the two tables is the trend in the last column. In both 1982 
and 1985, the proportion of cases litigated rises dramatically with the 
amount of compensation paid on the case. Unfortunately, the limita 
tions of bivariate analysis prevent us from discerning the direction of 
causality. Does litigation lead to higher dollar totals? Alternatively, are 
the higher dollar payments indicative of more severe, complex cases, 
which lead to litigation?
Table 2.9 presents an overall summary of the compensation experi 
ence of the litigated and unlitigated cases. At the outset, we should note
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Table 2.5 Legal Event Classification Used by the Delaware Industrial 
Accident Board
The Delaware data sets record nine distinct categories of petitions. These are:
• determine compensation due
• determine compensation due for deceased employee's estate
• review petition (obsolete category)
• determine additional compensation due (used in permanency cases)
• determine compensation for disfigurement
• review case for purposes of terminating benefits
• review to determine whether injury qualifies as a "second injury"
• commutation of weekly payments (that is, request a lump-sum payment)
• other (frequently the classification of a second and all subsequent peti 
tions on an injury)
A case is classified as contested if it contains at least one petition. For each 







• appeal to Superior Court
• decision rendered by Superior Court
• appeal to Delaware Supreme Court
• decision rendered by Delaware Supreme Court
• award mailed (an administrative action)
• settlement
• conference call
• remanded to lower court (rarely occurs, and only if the higher court dis 
covers an error in the IAB or lower court deliberation)
• hold pending outcome of other legal activity elsewhere (used when 
either attorney is interested in precedent that may be set in another case) 
SOURCE: Delaware Industrial Accident Board.
Table 2.6 Number of Events by Type of Insurer and Type of Petition, Delaware Data, 1982 and 1985
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NOTE: Numbers in parentheses represent percentages of column totals. Percentages may not sum to 100 due to founding.
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Table 2.7 Average Total Weekly Compensation Paid for Temporary Total 
Disability by Litigation Status of Case, Delaware Data, 1982 
and 1985
Average total weekly






















































































































































NOTE: Numbers in parentheses represent percentages of column totals. Percentages may not 
sum to 100 due to rounding. All dollar figures are expressed in 1982 dollars, 
a. Percentage of total for row.
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Table 2.8 Average Total Indemnity Paid by Litigation Status of Case, 
Delaware Data, 1982 and 1985






















































































































































NOTE: Numbers in parentheses represent percentages of column totals. Percentages may not 
sum to 100 due to rounding. All dollar figures are expressed in 1982 dollars, 
a. Percentage of total for row.
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that the litigation rate in Delaware of 1982 lost-time injuries was 16 
percent. Of course, this means that the large majority of all workers 
suffering lost-time injuries (84 percent) were compensated without 
having to resort to the state's dispute resolution mechanism.
The compensation figures in tables 2.7 through 2.9 have been 
adjusted to account for changes in the Consumer Price Index and are 
expressed in 1982 dollars. The differences between the litigated and 
unlitigated groups as a whole are sizable and appear in each of the 
three employer categories. Division of the data set according to the 
presence of litigation reveals two distinctly different types of cases, 
with respect to their compensation levels.
Tables 2.10 and 2.11 summarize the extent to which particular types 
of injuries are litigated. Table 2.10 examines the incidence of litigation 
according to the part of the body injured. Of those cases for which we 
have a definite injury classification, cases that involve body system 
injuries rank first in frequency of litigation, with a 31.6 percent litiga 
tion rate for 1982. For 1985, other head injuries rank first with a 23.1 
percent litigation rate. Multiple part injuries in 1982 and back injuries 
in both years also rank high in terms of litigation rates. Table 2.11 dis 
plays similar information, but with respect to the nature of the injury, 
where "sprains and strains" are shown to be the dominant type of iden 
tified injury among litigated cases.
Table 2.12 gives a perspective on whether the litigation rate varies 
with the location in Delaware where the injury occurred. Interestingly, 
in 1982, the litigation rate was highest for injuries occurring in New 
Castle County, the most urban of the three counties in Delaware, with 
the frequency declining as the injury location moves south, downstate. 
By 1985, the differential in dispute rates between the counties had dis 
appeared.
An issue addressed in table 2.13 is the question of whether the 
industry of the injured worker is associated with the propensity to liti 
gate a workers' compensation case. Although no clear pattern arises 
with regard to the incidence of litigation, construction and manufactur 
ing comprise about 49 percent of the litigated cases in 1982 and about 
40 percent in 1985. When the service and wholesale and retail indus 
tries are included, the percentage rises to more than 78 percent.
Table 2.9 Summary of Compensation Experience for Compensated Cases, Permanent Partial Disability, Delaware 
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NOTE: All dollar figures are expressed in 1982 dollars. When the type of carrier is unknown, these cases are included in the "Commercial Carrier" cate 
gory in this table, 
a. Cases that received no compensation are excluded from all averages in this table.
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Table 2.10 Part of Body Injured by Litigation Status of Case, Delaware 
Data, 1982 and 1985
Selected parts 























































































































Table 2.10 Part of Body Injured by Litigation Status of Case, Delaware 
Data, 1982 and 1985 (continued)
Selected parts 





















































































































NOTE: Numbers in parentheses represent percentages of column totals. Percentages may not 
sum to 100 due to rounding. 
a. Percentage of total for row.
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NOTE: Numbers in parentheses represent percentages of column totals. Percentages may not 
sum to 100 due to rounding. 
a. Percentage of total for row.
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Table 2.12 County of Injury by Litigation Status of Case, Delaware Data, 
1982 and 1985







































































NOTE: Numbers in parentheses represent percentages of column totals. Percentages may not 
sum to 100 due to rounding. 
a. Percentage of total for row.
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NOTE: Numbers in parentheses represent percentages of column totals. Percentages may not 
sum to 100 due to Founding, 
a. Percentage of total for row.
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NOTE: Numbers in parentheses represent percentages of column totals. Percentages may not 
sum to 100 due to rounding. 
a. Percentage of total for row.
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Table 2.15 Gender of Claimant by Litigation Status of Case, Delaware 
Data, 1982 and 1985























































NOTE: Numbers in parentheses represent percentages of column totals. Percentages may not 
sum to 100 due to rounding. 
a. Percentage of total for row.
Tables 2.14 and 2.15 show the propensity to litigate by age and gen 
der, respectively, of the injured worker. No clear pattern emerges from 
these bivariate tables. In chapter 4, we will examine the effects of these 
variables within the context of multivariate models explaining whether 
or not a case is litigated and the levels of workers' compensation bene 
fits.
Summary
This chapter has discussed the construction and contents of the data 
base on lost-time injuries in Delaware during 1982 and 1985. The data
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base includes a nearly complete case history on about 98 percent of 
1982 and 1985 lost-time injuries.
Nearly 16 percent of all lost-time injuries in both 1982 and 1985 
were litigated. Approximately one-third of all disputed cases involved 
more than one issue. Each case may involve one or more events (e.g., 
IAB hearing, pretrial hearing, superior court hearing). The econometric 
models estimated in chapter 4 assume a case is contested if at least one 
event occurs in the administrative and/or judicial process.
Disputes over disfigurement compensation accounted for nearly 10 
percent of all disputes during 1982. Another 26.5 percent of all dis 
putes involved requests for additional compensation, which are typi 
cally associated with a permanent partial disability. Employers filed 22 
percent of petitions, most of which requested permission to terminate 
compensation benefits.
The formal dispute resolution mechanism is typically initiated well 
after an injury occurs. Only about 28 percent of all petitions involving 
1982 injuries were filed within six months of the injury. Petitions 
requesting permanent partial awards (additional compensation) take 
the longest to surface, with over 70 percent filed a year or more after 
the date of injury.
The proportion of cases litigated was higher for private sector, self- 
insured firms (28.7 percent in 1982 and 24.8 percent in 1985), com 
pared to either self-insured public sector or commercially insured 
employers. Private sector, self-insured firms had a higher percentage of 
cases that involved only a single dispute. Also, the 1985 data reveal 
that private sector, self-insured disputes were significantly more likely 
to proceed to an IAB hearing, as opposed to settling earlier. Taken 
together, the evidence suggests that private sector, self-insured firms 
employ a different strategy for arriving at their agreements to compen 
sate.
Not surprisingly, disputes arose frequently for cases involving body 
system, multiple injuries, other head, back injuries, and sprains and 
strains, which involve relatively more subjective evaluation of the 
extent of injury and subsequent impairment. Finally, across all three 
types of insurers, litigated cases involve substantially higher dollar 
amounts of total compensation than unlitigated cases. The multivariate 
analysis in chapter 4 will investigate these relationships in greater 
detail.
Appendix Table 2.1 Self-Insured Employers in Delaware
Public sector self-insured agencies
City of Wilmington 
New Castle County 
State of Delaware
Private sector self-insured firms
Allegheny Corp./Jones Manufacturing
American Telephone & Telegraph
American District Telegraph
AMOCO
AT&T Communications of Delaware
AT&T Communications, Inc.
AT&T Technologies, Inc.









Container Corp. of America
Delaware Humane Assoc.
Delmarva Power & Light Co.
Diamond State Telephone
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.
Esmark, Inc.









Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.





Intn. Terminal Operating Co./Ameriport
John Sexton & Co.




Manufacturing Life Insurance Co.
Mason Dixon Lines, Inc.
Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc.
Montgomery Ward Credit Corp.
N.L. Industries, Inc.
Nabisco Brands, Inc.
PI E Nation Wide Inc.-Ryder
Peoples Life Insurance Co.
Perdue Farms, Inc.
PPG Industries, Inc.




Sears Roebuck Acceptance Corp.
Sears Roebuck & Co.
Service American Corp. (Macke)
SES, Inc.
Shell Oil Co.
St. Francis Hospital, Inc.




United States Steel Corp.
Vlasic Foods, Inc.
W.L. Gore & Associates
Walden Book Co.
Warner Co.






SOURCE: Delaware Industrial Accident Board. This information was obtained in May 1990. 
These are large employers whose type of workers' compensation insurance has changed little 
over the time period covered by this study.
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NOTES
1. The following discussion of the two approaches draws heavily on Hunt (1982).
2. For the majority of open cases no activity had occurred for at least two years, with the only 
missing item being the letter of receipt of final payment.
3. This issue is discussed further in the next section.
4. The Delaware-Pennsylvania Compensation Rating Bureau has much more detailed data 
than we possess on projected future losses relating to a given claim. Our indemnity figures reflect 
only what had been explicitly awarded or already paid as of mid-1990. Their data include the 
insurance carrier's estimate of future liability on each claim.
5. This is a major difference between the Delaware data discussed in chapters 2 through 4 and 
the Michigan data discussed in chapter 5. As will be noted below, we do have 177 observations on 
injuries that were litigated but remained uncompensated. Presumably, the disputed issue revolved 
around compensability. Although these cases appear in tables 2.1 and 2.2, no data were available 
on the variables used in the multivariate equation estimates of chapter 4. Consequently, these 177 
cases were dropped from the chapter 4 analysis as well as from tables 2.3, 2.4, and 2.6 through 
2.15.
6. The February 1987 date is the base because the 1982 data were originally received from the 
Delaware IAB in February 1987 and were updated in May 1990.
7. Also, some of the 27 cases that were contested with major injuries may be given payments 
in the future; however, some of the payments received between 1987 and 1990 may have been 
final settlements, which had not yet been recorded as such by May 1990.
8. No information was available as to whether five of these cases were open or closed.
9. It would be quite a different matter if, for example, a fifth of all cases were still open by the 
end of the observation period.
10. If the state average weekly wage is $300, the maximum any worker can receive as com 
pensation will be $200 per week of lost time. Workers earning more than $300 will collect some 
thing less than a two-thirds replacement of their lost wages since their payments are capped at 
$200 per week. Injured workers earning less than $300 per week are not constrained by this cap 
and will receive two-thirds of their wages as compensation.
11. For example, assume that the law provides for 220 weeks of compensation to be paid to a 
worker with an amputated hand. If an injured worker instead loses part of the function of a hand 
(no amputation), compensation is due for the extent of the impairment. It would be computed as a 
fraction of 220 weeks, with the fraction to be determined by the percentage loss of use of the hand 
suffered by the worker . This percentage is subject to substantial disagreement, which can result in 
formal litigation.
12. The empirical analysis in chapter 4 will focus on the probability that an injury will spawn 
any dispute, that is, the probability of a disputed injury.
13. This table is based on the total number of controverted cases (775) that existed in the DIA 
files as of February 1987.
14. We distinguish original from subsequent petitions because compensability issues associ 
ated with some injuries become so complex that multiple petitions are filed before a case is finally 
closed. Moreover, a peculiar feature of Delaware law is that attorney fees are determined per issue 
contested. Obviously, such a fee structure encourages the fragmentation of an injury dispute into 
multiple issues, and the multiple filing of petitions per injury.
15. Of course, an employee may be reluctant to sign because he/she may feel additional com 
pensation might be warranted in the future. However, Delaware law provides for this contingency 
with the five-year window of opportunity for petitioning to reopen a case. Thus, the IAB, upon
50
The Delaware Data and Characteristics of the Workers' Compensation System 51
petition from the employer, can administratively close a case for which all agreed-upon payments 
have been made, without a worker forfeiting the right to request additional compensation.
16. Appendix table 2.1 lists all employers approved to self-insure their workers' compensation 
coverage in Delaware as of April 1987. Note that there are only three employers in the group of 
public self-insured agencies: the City of Wilmington, New Castle County, and the State of Dela 
ware.
17. Another difference is in the proportion of injuries involving litigation over whether or not 
the injury is compensable at all. In 1982, the DIA recorded 4,025 compensable lost-time injuries 
in Delaware (593 from public self-insured agencies, 276 from private self-insured firms, 3,023 
from commercially insured employers, and 133 with unknown type of insurance). Also arising 
from injuries in 1982 were an additional 177 disputed cases that were never compensated (16 
from public self-insured agencies, 53 from private self-insured firms, 69 from commercially 
insured firms, and 39 with unknown type of insurance). Calculations reveal that over 16 percent of 
compensated or litigated cases associated with private sector, self-insured firms [537(276 + 53)] 
involved disputes over compensability that were not resolved in favor of the worker. This figure is 
substantially above the 2 to 3 percent rates for the other two groups of employers.
18. A ninth petition type ("review petition") listed in table 2.5 is obsolete.

3 
An Economic Model of Workers©
Compensation Litigation 
and an Empirical Methodology
This chapter presents the economic model that serves as the concep 
tual foundation for the empirical work in chapters 4 and 5. The dispute 
resolution framework of Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989) is helpful as a 
general background to the model. According to this approach, disputes 
can be divided into four phases. We will describe each phase, along 
with its counterpart in the Delaware workers' compensation system.
First, we should clarify the terms "dispute" and "litigation." When 
acceptable compensation is forthcoming from the employer, the "dis 
pute" ends before it really gets under way, i.e., in phase 2. In this 
framework, "litigation" is different from "dispute." A dispute always 
exists as a result of an accident or injury involving two parties. But liti 
gation, which we discuss in detail in subsequent pages, only occurs 
when phase 2 leads to phase 3.
Moreover, the discussion of phases 2 and 3 shows that the employee 
goes through some evaluation of whether the offered compensation is 
sufficient; this is an important part of the dispute resolution process. 
The two parties interact, and information is exchanged; compensation 
is not automatic. Exclusion of nonlitigated cases from the scope of the 
model eliminates a good chunk of what the conceptual model is 
intended to explain. The general model developed by Cooter and 
Rubinfeld, because it is trying to explain whether or not a case is liti 
gated, requires inclusion of the population in question; in our applica 
tion, this consists of lost-time workers' compensation cases, not just 
the litigated ones.
Phase 1. There is an underlying event, such as an accident, in which 
one party allegedly harms another.
In the context of workers' compensation, phase 1 corre 
sponds to the occurrence of a lost-time injury.
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Phase 2. The injured party decides whether or not to assert a legal 
claim.
The period after the injury corresponds to phase 2, during 
which the employee must decide whether to press a legal 
claim (file a petition); this decision will hinge on what the 
employer offers as compensation. If the employer makes an 
offer of compensation, the employee may choose to accept, 
and the dispute is ended. Indeed, chapter 2 revealed this to 
be the outcome in Delaware for 84 percent of lost-time inju 
ries during 1982. Alternatively, the employee may not accept 
the offer because it is viewed as inadequate; in this case, the 
employee must decide whether to press forward by filing a 
petition for a formal hearing before the Industrial Accident 
Board (IAB).
Phase 3. This is the period after the assertion of a legal claim but 
before a trial: "A bargaining game whose cooperative solu 
tion corresponds to a settlement out of court and whose non- 
cooperative solution corresponds to an adversarial trial" 
(Cooter and Rubinfeld 1989, p. 1069).
In the context of the workers' compensation system in Dela 
ware, some bargaining takes place prior to the assertion of a 
legal claim (the filing of a petition) and some afterward. This 
occurs because not every injured party has to file suit to be 
compensated. Consequently, the distinction between phase 2 
and phase 3 (bargaining over compensation) is somewhat 
blurred. However, it may be helpful to think of phase 3 as 
consisting of two distinct stages: one prior to a petition and 
one after the petition but before a trial. The critical feature of 
both periods is some degree of "pretrial discovery," which 
provides the basis for bargaining. In particular, physician 
opinions are solicited regarding the extent of injury and 
impairment. The central feature of the economic model of 
dispute resolution that will generate a settlement outcome 
(either before or after a petition is filed) is that both parties 
continue to revise their estimates of the expected outcome of 
a formal hearing throughout the bargaining/learning periods 
leading up to a trial (IAB hearing).
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Litigation costs may accelerate with the filing of the petition, 
so there is a distinction between phase 2 and phase 3. Still, it 
is the learning process that causes some cases to drop out 
over time and that is characteristic of the entire period 
between the time of injury and the TAB hearing.
Phase 4. Some cases result in a court-imposed solution to the dispute.
Phase 4 corresponds to the IAB hearing or appeal to the 
superior or supreme courts of Delaware.
An Economic Model
Assume that both employee and employer are risk neutral, wealth 
maximizers as they consider the appropriate compensation following 
an injury. Assume also that the "American Rule" for determining pay 
ment of legal fees applies: each party to a dispute pays his/her own 
legal costs. Either party can initiate litigation by filing a petition for a 
hearing before the IAB. As described in the previous chapter, petitions 
filed by workers generally involve requests for compensation. Con 
versely, petitions filed by employers generally involve termination of 
compensation benefits.
In the case of a petition filed by a worker who believes compensa 
tion is due, we assume that the worker (possibly with a lawyer's assis 
tance) formulates an expectation of appropriate compensation, based 
on what similar injuries have been awarded through settlements or for 
mal hearings in the past. The worker will then subtract the expected lit 
igation costs associated with formally contesting a case to arrive at an 
"asking price," or minimum settlement amount. The employer (possi 
bly with the advice of an insurance carrier, assumed to have knowledge 
of previous awards for purposes of formulating an expectation of the 
hearing outcome) goes through a similar calculation. The employer's 
"maximum offer price" will equal the expected award to the worker 
should the case go to a formal hearing plus the associated litigation 
costs. Assuming all decision makers are wealth maximizers, the case 
would be settled without a formal hearing if the employer's maximum 
offer price exceeds the employee's asking price.
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Assume further that there are no asymmetric gains. That is, there is 
no possibility that an IAB decision will set a precedent for similar 
injury cases, in which an employer or insurance company could stand 
to lose more than a single worker stands to gain. The rationale for this 
assumption is that the employer is already strictly liable for injury; 
therefore, fault is not an issue, either in this case or in any other compa 
rable case.
Winning or losing a particular case will not likely adversely affect 
the employer's public image or methods and costs of operations. The 
particulars of each injury case that truly influence the amount of com 
pensation (typically, estimates of impairment) are so case-specific as to 
have no applicability to later cases. The same can be argued for ques 
tions of job-relatedness. This assumption eliminates the troublesome 
theoretical prospect of nuisance suits filed to extort settlements from a 
defendant, which are common in the product liability arena.' We also 
assume that there is no strategic behavior. Neither party behaves as 
though his/her actions will affect the actions of the other, now or in the 
future.2
Finally, we assume that the costs of negotiating a settlement are zero 
but that the costs of formal litigation are positive. 3 Under these condi 
tions, the following expression clarifies that a hearing occurs if and 
only if the disagreement on the expected award exceeds the sum of the 
two parties' legal costs. These assumptions are primarily made for the 
sake of theoretical tractability: we are interested in deriving a basic 
model that will be useful as a guide to empirical work. An empirical 
application of this model is discussed in the next section. Our theoreti 
cal model is not realistic in every respect, but we want to show in a 
simple framework that expected costs and benefits play important roles 
in workers' compensation litigation.
Assume the following:
1. The plaintiff files a petition for an IAB hearing. The defendant is 
the other party to the dispute.
An Economic Model 57
2. We define:
Z = amount in dispute (expected IAB award),
Pp - plaintiff's estimate of the probability of winning at trial (at
the IAB), 
Pd = defendant's estimate of the probability of plaintiff winning
at trial,
X = plaintiff's legal costs, and 
Y = defendant's legal costs.
3. Z is viewed as identical for both parties.
After filing a petition, a hearing occurs if
defendant offer price - plaintiff asking price < 0. 
Formally, this is
which we can rewrite as
((Prf«z)-(pp -z))
Rearranging terms, we obtain
If we assume that PD < Pp, i.e., that the plaintiff is more optimistic than 
the defendant, it follows that
\(Pd -Pp-)-Z\>X + Y.
In other words, a hearing occurs if the divergence on the expected 
award \(Pd - Pp) . Z\ exceeds the sum of the legal costs.
Factors likely to affect the decision to litigate generally include 
those influencing (1) the degree of uncertainty with respect to the out 
come of a formal hearing, (2) the dollar amount of the potential award, 
and (3) litigation costs.
Of course, some cases are settled after a petition is filed but prior to 
final verdict. In these situations, either the plaintiff's minimum asking 
price and/or the defendant's maximum offer price change sufficiently 
in the intervening period to create a spread that allows a mutually 
agreeable settlement to be negotiated.
Why would these reservation prices change? We shall assume that 
new information is revealed in the process of filing a formal petition 
and in proceeding with a series of prehearing discussions/conferences. 
The information may pertain directly to the plaintiff's condition or
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simply affect the plaintiff's (and defendant's) expectations regarding 
the likely outcome of a hearing. In any event, we assume that both par 
ties have an opportunity to learn more about the merits of the case as 
the formal litigation process develops. This new information prompts a 
revision of the "ask" and "offer" prices.
For example, suppose an injured worker feels that he/she is eligible 
for compensation but that the employer disagrees. At this initial stage 
there may be an information asymmetry. The employee has better 
information about his/her true condition than does the employer. Esti 
mates by the parties of Pj and Pp, and possibly Z, may differ. After the 
petition (to determine compensation due) is filed, our assumption is 
that the newly available information causes the difference between 
estimates of Pd and Pp to narrow. As the difference in estimates about 
the expected dollar value of a hearing outcome shrinks, the gains 
diminish from utilizing the formal dispute resolution process, with 
associated legal costs. Some cases will settle. The model reveals that 
the factors affecting the decision to pursue a case to verdict or to settle 
are similar to the factors affecting the decision to file a petition and 
invoke the dispute resolution process.
The logic of the model dictates that those cases not settling are 
somewhat unusual. Priest and Klein (1984) point out that disputes 
reaching a formal trial constitute neither a random nor representative 
sample of the set of all disputes. This occurs because, when disputing 
parties behave as described in the preceding general model, the only 
cases that do not settle in advance are those with characteristics that 
lead to persistent divergence in expected outcomes. This bit of insight 
enables us to generate predictions regarding characteristics of litigated 
cases, which will be discussed in more detail in chapters 4 and 5.
Specification of an Estimable Statistical Model
In data sets such as those available to us, there is information on 
characteristics of injured workers and their employers. These charac 
teristics are likely to affect both the expected benefits and costs of initi 
ating and pursuing litigation. For example, the wage of the injured 
worker affects both the dollar amount of the potential award as well as 
the cost of litigation since being involved in litigation and remaining
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away from one's job impose an opportunity cost. The age of the injured 
worker affects both the expected gains from litigation and the opportu 
nity cost of being away from work. In particular, during the early 
phases of a person's career, an individual accumulates on-the-job train 
ing that increases future wages. Over later phases of careers, less (or 
no) on-the-job training occurs, and the rate of wage growth is smaller. 
Therefore, a young worker may face higher opportunity costs of litigat 
ing and remaining off the job (by giving up wages that are increasing 
quickly) than an older worker. Older workers tend to have higher earn 
ings (and therefore higher potential workers' compensation payments), 
which rise more slowly than earnings of younger workers, so there is 
less of an impact on the rate of wage growth for an older worker than 
for a younger worker who remains off the job.
The type of injury will affect whether there is a disagreement over 
its nature and extent. For example, soft-tissue, back, and joint injuries 
are generally harder to evaluate objectively and are more subject to dis 
agreements.4 The job a worker performs is likely to influence the sever 
ity of injury, which may lead to disagreements over the readiness of the 
employee to resume work. The kind of insurance coverage may affect 
the probability that an employer engages in litigation (as observed in 
chapter 2). Injury severity may also be related to the type of output an 
employer produces.
Clearly, many of the preceding variables affect the expected gains 
and costs of litigation to some party in a dispute. Since it is not obvious 
how to disentangle the determinants of offer and asking prices, we 
adopt a reduced form approach in which characteristics of workers and 
firms regarded as given (exogenous) affect the probability of litigation 
(defined as one or more disputes giving rise to petitions for IAB 
review), the probability that a case is pursued to verdict (IAB hearing 
or award on one or more petitions), and the amount of indemnity pay 
ments to injured workers. 5
In developing a set of reduced form equations for estimation pur 
poses, the following summary of the theoretical discussion is relevant: 
a potential dispute over compensation in a work injury case involves 
two parties, the worker and the employer (if self-insured) or the insur 
ance company (if the employer is commercially insured). Given the 
existence of a dispute, a case is contested (litigated) if for either party 
the expected utility from contesting is greater than the expected utility
60 An Economic Model
from not contesting. Both parties may choose to contest simulta 
neously the same or different aspects of a case. Also, either or both par 
ties may choose to contest several aspects of the same case. A 
contestant may choose to pursue a dispute to verdict, to withdraw, or to 
settle the dispute. After a verdict is rendered at one level, the parties to 
the dispute may appeal the verdict to a higher judicial level. At each 
level, they have the option of pursuing or of not pursuing the dispute to 
verdict. The highest appeal, although not used often, would occur in 
the Delaware Supreme Court.
For each case, we also observe the total monetary payment (indem 
nity payment) to the worker. Most work injury cases are not contested 
(3,325 out of a total of 3,951 cases in 1982, or 84.2 percent, and 3,647 
out of a total of 4,328 cases in 1985, or 84.3 percent, as reported in 
table 2.3), and most of those that are contested involve a single dispute. 
A small number of cases, however, involve multiple events (e.g., pre- 
trial hearing) and disputes by both parties, with some aspects of the 
disputes pursued to verdict. Also, some verdicts are appealed while 
others are not, occasionally all in connection with the same case. Mod 
eling this process in detail is very complicated and will most likely 
lead to empirical models that are impractical to estimate, since only a 
very small number of cases involve certain complicated sequences of 
judicial events.
Our objectives are more modest. In order to be able to specify 
empirical models whose estimation is practical, we adopt a simplified 
approach summarized by five equations:
(3.1) Ct =
(3.2) Pt =
(3.3) A lt =
(3.4) A2i =
(3.5) A3l- =G xi + e5i .
C and P are theoretical constructs that may be called, respectively, 
individuals' "propensity to contest a case" and "propensity to pursue a 
case to verdict." C and P are not observed. Instead, in the data and for
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each individual, we observe c and p with each taking the value of 1 if 
the case was contested (pursued) and 0 otherwise (binary variables). 
A j ; A2 and A3 are the natural logarithms of cumulative indemnity pay 
ments (awards) to injured workers in 1982 dollars for (1) uncontested 
cases, (2) contested cases not pursued to verdict, and (3) contested 
cases pursued to verdict, respectively. The vector of variables jc 
includes measures of workers' traits along with characteristics of their 
injuries and employers. The observation index is i. B, D, E, F and G are 
coefficient vectors, and e\ through e5 are random error terms. Equation 
(3.1) relates the probability that a case is litigated (at least one petition 
pertaining to an injury filed for IAB review) to exogenous right-hand- 
side variables (i.e., the jc^s)6 and a random error term (ej/).
Earlier, we designated a case as being pursued to verdict when there 
is at least one sequence of judicial events, beginning with a petition 
and ending in an award or mailing of a payment, for closed cases and at 
least one sequence of events, ending in a hearing, for open cases. Equa 
tion (3.2) relates the probability that a contested case is pursued to ver 
dict to exogenous regressors and an error term (^2/)- Equation (3.3) 
relates the natural logarithm of the cumulative payments (or awards) in 
1982 dollars to injured workers in uncontested cases to exogenous 
regressors and an error term (e^. Equations (3.4) and (3.5) apply to 
payments to injured workers in contested cases that were not pursued 
to verdict and contested cases that were pursued to verdict, respec 
tively. In equations (3.3) through (3.5) the left-hand-side variables are 
the natural logarithms of payments, while the right-hand-side variables 
are in arithmetic form. This semilogarithmic functional form is appro 
priate because the observed frequency distribution of awards has a pro 
nounced thin right tail. 7 In other words, the frequency of relatively 
large awards is low.
Equations (3.1) and (3.2) are reduced forms relating the respective 
binary left-hand-side variable to characteristics of the injured worker 
and the employer (such as type of insurance and industrial sector of 
employment or firm) without making a distinction as to who initiates a 
dispute and what sequence of judicial events is followed. For policy 
purposes, it is important to be able to predict how particular changes in 
the state's industrial structure or in insurance arrangements are likely 
to affect the incidence of litigation as well as the average value of 
awards to injured workers. Equations such as (3.1) through (3.5) can
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answer such questions. They cannot, however, answer questions 
regarding the effect of changes in exogenous variables on the fre 
quency of certain events (e.g., the type of appeal) in the dispute resolu 
tion system since we do not distinguish between specific types of 
events empirically. Equation (3.2) is intended to indicate those litigated 
cases likely to have used the largest amounts of resources of the dis 
pute resolution system.
For three reasons, we do not make a distinction between contested 
cases initiated by workers or contested cases initiated by employers. 
First, some cases are initiated by both parties simultaneously beginning 
litigation on different aspects of a case. Second, every contested case 
requires that both parties behave in a manner such that the case is not 
settled informally. Who initiates litigation by first filing a petition is not 
of central concern to our study; we are mainly interested in finding out 
the relationship between exogenous characteristics of workers or firms 
and the probability that a case goes through the formal dispute resolu 
tion mechanism. Third, the interests of both parties are similar regard 
less of who initiates litigation: one party wishes to receive greater 
compensation, and one party wishes to provide smaller compensation 
than would otherwise result. The observed outcome is an equilibrium 
whose determinants we wish to study.
We do not distinguish contested cases by who "won" or "lost" the 
litigation because, in many situations, it is possible for the parties to 
achieve some but not all of their desired aims; thus the definition of 
"win" or "lose" becomes an arbitrary determination by the research 
ers. 8 We study payments to workers that are continuous measures of the 
outcome of each case (i.e., dollars of compensation) because these do 
not require us to make judgments as to who won a case.
The right-hand-side variables in equations (3.1) through (3.5) that 
we treat as exogenous include the type of insurance and sector of 
employment or the type of self-insured employer. Dummy variables 
are used for public sector self-insured agencies, for self-insured major 
automakers, for self-insured major chemicals manufacturers, and for 
other self-insured firms. The omitted category is commercially insured 
employers. Employee variables include the worker's gender, age, age 
squared, the natural logarithm of the worker's wage at the time of the 
injury (measured in 1982 dollars), and the industry of employment. 
Also included is the county of location when the injury took place
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(New Castle or Kent; the omitted category is Sussex, the only other 
county in Delaware), the part of the body injured, and the type of 
injury.
As indicated in chapter 2, it is possible that type of insurance and 
firm may affect the probability of litigation and how far litigation is 
pursued. The theoretical model presented in the previous section 
assumes that there are no asymmetric gains from litigation (no prece 
dent to be set). In reality, asymmetric gains are possible. It may well be 
that self-insured firms are more concerned than commercial insurers 
about precedent-setting cases because self-insured firms are less able 
to spread risk than commercial insurers. If this is the case, self-insured 
firms may contest cases for which the up-front gains do not exceed the 
up-front litigation costs. Why? Because they expect significant cost 
savings in the future.
The binary variables for body part injured and type of injury are 
proxies for the degree of uncertainty regarding the outcome of litiga 
tion, due to the difficulty of measuring the extent of certain types of 
injuries. These variables take the value one if the specified body part 
was injured or the specified type of injury occurred and zero otherwise. 
We also include variables showing gender, age, and wage at time of 
injury, all of which are related to the opportunity cost of litigation. In 
addition, we have a set of binary variables for industry of employment, 
to indicate aspects of the severity of injury that are otherwise not cap 
tured by the other "part of body" and "type of injury" measures. These 
variables take the value one if an injured worker worked in the speci 
fied industry and zero otherwise.
Since the left-hand-side variables of equations (3.1) and (3.2) are 
binary, an appropriate estimation technique is probit. The left-hand- 
side variables of equations (3.3) through (3.5) are continuous, so, 
under certain circumstances, we can estimate these equations by ordi 
nary least squares (OLS). OLS is suitable if the error terms of equa 
tions (3.1) through (3.5) are uncorrelated. If the error terms are 
correlated, other estimation techniques are appropriate. Whether the 
error terms of the equations are or are not correlated is an empirical 
matter. In the appendix to this chapter, we discuss certain plausible cor 
relations of the error terms in general and outline an empirical strategy 
to find out whether this is an important problem in practice.
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It is possible that equations (3.3) through (3.5) could be collapsed 
into fewer equations (either two or one) if the coefficient estimates of 
some payment equations do not differ significantly from those of other 
payment equations. This empirical issue is explored in the next chapter.
Chapter 4 reports estimates of the reduced form equations (3.1) 
through (3.5) for injuries that took place in Delaware in 1982 and in 
1985. Chapter 5, which analyzes Michigan data, only provides esti 
mates of equations (3.1) and (3.2); equations (3.3) through (3.5) cannot 
be estimated for Michigan due to data limitations.
APPENDIX 
A Model With Correlated Error Terms
Bivariate probit is an appropriate estimator if the error terms of equations 
(3.1) and (3.2) are correlated. Such correlation may arise because of the pres 
ence of omitted variables affecting both the probability that a case is contested 
and that it is pursued to verdict. These omitted variables describe characteris 
tics of the workers or of their injuries that are known to the parties to a dispute 
but are unobserved by the researchers.
For example, certain back injuries (more so than other types of back inju 
ries) may make it more likely that there will be a disagreement among the par 
ties, leading to a case being contested. These same types of back injuries may 
make it more likely that a case will be pursued to verdict because less informa 
tion, which may make the parties narrow their differences, becomes available 
during the pretrial period.
As an illustration, our data only tell us that there was a back injury but not 
what type of back injury it was. If the back injury was of the kind just de 
scribed, this fact will be captured by the error term of the contest equation (3.1) 
and by the error term of the pursue equation (3.2), and so the error terms will 
be correlated. If we ignore this correlation, the resulting probit estimates will 
be biased. Bivariate probit takes account of this possibility and permits us to 
test for significant correlation between the error terms of the two equations.
Another type of plausible correlation of the error terms of the contest and 
the pursue equations is with the error terms of the payment equations: For ex 
ample, unobserved characteristics that increase the probability of cases being 
contested (or pursued) may also increase payments. If such correlation is 
present and we ignore it, biased estimates of the payment equations are likely. 
This bias is known as selectivity bias.
We implement a two-step estimator formulated by Tunali (1986), which 
permits us to test for and control for double selection in the payment equations. 
A simpler selectivity model, the switching regression setup formulated by Lee 
(1978), was also estimated; in this approach, equations (3.4) and (3.5) are col 
lapsed into one equation relevant to payments in contested cases (without any 
distinction as to whether a case was pursued to verdict or not), and equation 
(3.2) is omitted. In this simpler model, we test whether the error term of the 
contest equation is correlated with the error terms of the payment equations. If 
we find no evidence of selectivity bias in the payment equations, then OLS is 
appropriate. In chapter 4, we explore the possible presence of correlation in the 
error terms of the contest and pursue equations and selectivity bias in the pay 
ment equations.
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NOTES
1. See Cooler and Rubinfeld (1989), pp. 1083-84.
2. We recognize that firms may have an incentive to cultivate an image as a tough bargainer in 
order to induce workers to accept the initial settlement offer. A referee noted that some firms (car 
riers) have a reputation for always contesting a questionable case. Other firms never contest. How 
ever, we lack sufficient firm-specific data for all firms that would allow us to categorize each firm 
according to likely strategies. Given the lack of theoretical consensus in economic models of stra 
tegic settlement behavior, we have opted for a simpler, nonstrategic theoretical model. As a practi 
cal matter, however, it is likely that our variables for type of insurance, industrial sector, and firm 
in our empirical work control for strategic behavior that, in fact, takes place. For more discussion 
on strategic behavior, see Cooler and Rubinfeld (1989), pp. 1078-1080.
3. This assumption is nol entirely realistic or necessary. Whal is needed is for selllemenl 
(negotiating) costs lo be less than trial costs. In other words, Ihe difference belween Irial costs and 
settlemenl cosls represenls the extra Iransaction costs incurred by holding oul for a formal Irial. As 
long as Ihese exlra cosls are greater lhan zero, Ihe logic of Ihe model follows. Consequenlly, many 
aulhors adopl the simplifying assumption of lelling settlemenl cosls be equal lo zero, and litiga- 
lion (Irial) cosls be greater than zero.
4. See Boden, Kern, and Gardner (1991) for a discussion of procedures for evaluating these 
hard-to-measure aspects relating to back injuries.
5. In order to be able lo eslimale separate equalions of Ihe delerminanls of offer and asking 
prices of Ihe parlies lo a dispute, we would need lo know which variables affecl some prices bul 
nol other prices. Theory offers no guidance on this issue, and we do not wish to proceed by mak 
ing arbitrary assumplions.
6. A righl-hand-side variable is exogenous if il is unaffected by Ihe left-hand-side variable. For 
example, in equalion (3.1) a worker's age may affecl Ihe probability of a case being liligaled; Ihe 
reverse is nol possible.
7. We assume lhal paymenls are lognormally dislribuled (a lognormal dislribulion has a long 
righl tail, and the nalural logarilhm of a lognormal random variable is normally dislribuled); hence 
Iheir nalural logarilhms are normal, salisfying Ihe assumplions of the general linear regression 
model.
8. From a practical standpoinl, Ihis would involve Ihe logislically formidable lask of sifting 
through transcripls of over 15,000 legal hearings in order lo Iry lo determine Ihe "winner" or 
"loser" of each judicial evenl. More importanl, ihough, is Ihe facl lhat many cases do nol have a 
clear winner. For example, suppose a worker claims lhal he/she should receive $15,000 bul lhal 
Ihe dispute resolulion system awards him $12,000. Has the worker won or lost?




In this chapter, we report estimates of the reduced form statistical 
model described in chapter 3. First, we briefly review some of the key 
characteristics of the 1982 and 1985 data, along with the important 
institutional factors associated with the workers' compensation system 
in Delaware. Variables used in the empirical model are then defined. 
Finally, we report the model's estimates of the determinants of (1) 
whether or not a case is litigated, (2) whether it is pursued to verdict, 
given that it is litigated, rather than settled or withdrawn, and (3) the 
level of indemnity payments (in 1982 dollars) to injured workers, 
based on the 1982 and 1985 Delaware workers' compensation data. 
Note that we use the terms litigated and contested interchangeably.
Brief Description of Institutions and Data
The characteristics of cases included in the Delaware data sets, 
along with our definitions of contested cases and of contested cases 
pursued to verdict, are discussed in this section. The reader should 
refer back to chapter 2 for a more complete description of the data.
Both Delaware data sets (1982 and 1985 injuries) exclude all cases 
in which a worker reports an injury but does not have lost time from his 
or her job. Information on these types of claims is not available to us 
because such cases are deleted from files after two years by the state 
agency administering the workers' compensation program. These tend 
to be cases in which a worker reports a minor injury that might result in 
disability but, in fact, does not.
67
68 The Determinants of Litigation and Payments
Compensability of an injury is a common source of disputes. Cases 
where the injury was ruled as not compensable (e.g., because the injury 
did not occur at work) are excluded from the data files by the Industrial 
Accident Board (IAB). Data for cases found to be "not compensable" 
only contain information as to when the case closed and whether the 
case was contested, with no further information on any of the other 
variables used in our analysis. 1
In our statistical analysis, the unit of account is a workers' compen 
sation case. A case may involve no litigation (when no petitions are 
filed), or it may involve litigation, with a single petition or multiple 
petitions. There are nine distinct categories of petitions in Delaware 
(see table 2.5). A case is classified as contested if it contains at least 
one of the nine possible types of petitions associated with workers' 
compensation in Delaware. For each type of petition, it is possible for 
many different legal events to occur. Four events are of importance in 
our estimated models: petition withdrawn without a hearing, IAB hear 
ing, IAB award, and mailing of an award (an administrative action).
Closed contested cases designated as pursued to verdict are those 
containing at least one sequence of legal events ending in an IAB hear 
ing, an award, or the mailing of an award. Open contested cases that 
include at least one sequence of legal events ending in a hearing are 
also categorized as pursued to verdict. All other cases are classified as 
not pursued to verdict.
Means and standard deviations for the variables used in our analysis 
are shown in table 4.1. In 1982, for example, in 14.8 percent of the 
cases the employer was self-insured and in the public sector. Also in 
1982, 24.9 percent of workers' compensation cases involved a back 
injury. Definitions of selected variables are shown in table 4.2.
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Table 4.1 Means and Standard Deviations of the Variables, Delaware 
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Table 4.1 Means and Standard Deviations of the Variables, Delaware 




























































SOURCE: Analysis based on data from Delaware Industrial Accident Board.
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Table 4.2 Selected Variable Definitions for Injuries, Delaware Data
Head Head, brain, multiple head injuries, head injury n.e.c. a
Face Face unspecified, multiple face injuries, face injury 
n.e.c.
Jaw Jaw, mouth, nose, scalp, skull
Neck Neck, upper extremities unspecified, upper extremi 
ties n.e.c.





Legs Legs unspecified, lower leg, leg multiple, leg n.e.c.
Knee Knee
Multiple parts Multiple parts
Body system Body system unspecified, circulatory system, diges 
tive system, excretory system, musculoskeletal sys 
tem, nervous system, respiratory system, other body 
systems
Other parts Body parts n.e.c., nonclassifiable
Amputation Amputation or enucleation
Burns Burn (heat), burn (chemical)
Sprains Sprains, strains
SOURCE: Delaware Industrial Accident Board, 
a. Not elsewhere classified.
Results for Delaware
Determinants of Litigation
Estimates of the determinants of whether or not a case is litigated 
(contested), as expressed in equation (3.1), are obtained using informa 
tion on 1982 injuries and appear in the first data column of table 4.3. 
The corresponding estimates based 1985 injuries appear in the first col 
umn of data in table 4.4. The second columns of tables 4.3 and 4.4
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Table 4.3 Maximum Likelihood Probit Estimates of the Contest and 
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Table 4.3 Maximum Likelihood Probit Estimates of the Contest and 

























































































NOTE: The t statistics are in parentheses.
*Denotes significance at the 10 percent level.
**Denotes significance at the 5 percent level.
a. Categories in the omitted groups for categorical variables include: commercially insured
employers, female employees, location in Sussex County, service industry, any other part of
body injured or nature of injury from those listed.
b. Variable not included in the pursue equation.
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Table 4.4 Maximum Likelihood Probit Estimates of the Contest and 
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NOTE: The t statistics are in parentheses.
*Denotes significance at the 10 percent level.
**Denotes significance at the 5 percent level, 
a. Variable not included in the pursue equation.
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report estimates of the determinants of whether a litigated case is pur 
sued to verdict for 1982 and 1985 injuries, respectively, as expressed in 
equation (3.2).
The equations for the probability that a case is litigated and that a 
litigated case is pursued to verdict are specified as probit. We will refer 
to these equations as the contest and pursue equations. Recall that we 
use the terms "litigate" and "contest" interchangeably. A positive coef 
ficient estimate in tables 4.3 or 4.4 means that the presence of this char 
acteristic or an increase in this characteristic raises the probability that 
a case is litigated (or pursued to verdict, depending upon which equa 
tion we are considering). A negative coefficient estimate in tables 4.3 
or 4.4 means that the presence of or increase in this characteristic low 
ers the probability that a case is litigated (or pursued to verdict, as 
appropriate). In tables 4.3 and 4.4, we indicate with two asterisks the 
coefficient estimates that are significant at the 5 percent level and with 
one asterisk the coefficients that are significant at the 10 percent level. 
Significance at the 5 percent level means that we are 95 percent certain 
that the coefficient differs from zero. Significance at the 10 percent 
level means that we are 90 percent certain that the coefficient differs 
from zero.2
We tested whether the error terms of the contest and pursue equa 
tions for a given year were significantly correlated, and we found no 
significant correlation for either 1982 or 1985. 3 In this way, we 
checked for a plausible failure in the conditions that must be satisfied 
for the probit models reported in tables 4.3 and 4.4 to be correct. Stated 
differently, we tested for the existence of significant common omitted 
determinants of both the probability of a case being contested and of 
being pursued to verdict. 4 Since this problem is not serious, our probit 
estimates are reliable. 5
In terms of major results, the first variables of interest involve the 
types of insurance and their impact on litigation. The baseline category 
is private sector, commercially insured employers. Coefficients for the 
variables representing insurance type are to be interpreted with respect 
to the baseline (omitted) group, commercially insured employers. Rel 
ative to a case in which the employer is commercially insured, a work 
ers' compensation injury is more likely to be contested (positive 
coefficient estimate) if the employer is one of the (self-insured) major 
automakers. Hunt (1982, p. 89) found the same result in his study of
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workers' compensation in Michigan. Cases in which the employer is 
one of the major self-insured chemicals manufacturers or other self- 
insured private sector employers are no more likely to be contested 
than cases in which the employer is commercially insured. Simply 
stated, the coefficients of the variables representing chemicals and 
other self-insured employers do not significantly differ from zero. 
These results are found for both 1982 and 1985.
As mentioned earlier, the greater probability that a case becomes 
contested when the employer is one of the major automakers has been 
found for Michigan as well as for Delaware. It is likely that we are cap 
turing some aspect of the industrial relations process in the automobile 
industry. It may also be that either the automakers or the United Auto 
Workers union (or both) are behaving strategically and wish to culti 
vate the image of a tough bargainer for workers' compensation or other 
industrial relations issues.
Cases in which the employer is self-insured and in the public sector 
are equally likely to be contested as when the employer is commer 
cially insured for 1982 injuries but less likely to be contested for 1985 
injuries.6 Over the course of the 1980s in Delaware, public sector 
employees' wages gradually declined relative to wages in the private 
sector. 7 It is possible that declining relative wages for public sector 
employees resulted in declining quality of the public sector work force, 
which led to less efficiency in spotting and contesting questionable 
claims.
It is easier to see the impact of type of insurance on the probability 
of litigation by studying some predictions based on the estimates in 
tables 4.3 and 4.4. All variables except type of insurance are set to their 
sample means for 1982 and 1985, respectively. The predictions should 
be interpreted as the effect of a particular variable on litigation, holding 
other factors the same. Table 4.5 shows predicted probabilities of liti 
gation for various types of insurance. The first column of data contains 
predictions for 1982, and the second column has predictions for 1985. 
In the 1982 data, the predicted probabilities of litigation do not differ 
much between private sector commercially insured firms and public 
sector self-insured ones (each is about 13 percent). The probability of 
litigation for the self-insured automakers is almost 60 percent, more 
than four times higher. For the self-insured chemicals manufacturers as 
well as other private sector self-insured firms, the predicted probabili-
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ties are moderately higher than for commercially insured private sector 
firms (by 30 and 25 percent). However, these differences are not statis 
tically significant.
Table 4.5 Predicted Litigation Probabilities by Type of Insurance, 
Delaware Data, 1982 and 1985
















SOURCE: Predictions based on models in tables 4.3 and 4.4.
NOTE: These predicted probabilities (we report them after multiplying them by 100) are 
obtained using the probit coefficients in the first data colums of table 4.3 and 4.4 and the sample 
means of all variables other than type of insurance for 1982 and 1985, respectively.
For 1985, some of the predicted probabilities for specified types of 
insurance increase and other probabilities decrease relative to 1982 
results. All of the predicted probabilities change because of changes in 
the mean characteristics of firms and workers, as shown in table 4.1. 
The predicted probabilities of litigation for specific insurance types 
also change over time because of changes in the coefficients of the liti 
gation equation, as can be seen by comparing the coefficients in the 
first columns of tables 4.3 and 4.4. 8 For example, there is evidence of a 
reduced tendency to contest a case over time when the employer is in 
the public sector.
In general, the predicted probabilities across insurance types in 1985 
display a similar pattern as in 1982. A notable difference compared to 
1982 is that the litigation probability declines for the public sector 
employers by about 12 percent. Also of interest is that the litigation 
probability increases for the automakers by 8 percent, but declines for 
other self-insured private sector firms (by 7.2 percent). For commer 
cially insured employers the litigation probability increases by 9.7 per 
cent. The large drop in the litigation probability for chemicals 
manufacturers is not statistically significant across the two years.
Returning to the coefficient estimates in the first columns of tables 
4.3 and 4.4, we document that in both years the probability of a case
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becoming contested increases with a worker's age but at a diminishing 
rate. The positive coefficient estimate for age and negative coefficient 
estimate for the square of age imply such a result. With all else held 
constant at each year's sample means, the probability of a case being 
contested reaches a maximum at age 40 in the 1982 data and at age 41 
in the 1985 data. Table 4.6 reports predicted litigation probabilities for 
each data set and for various ages. 9 In both years, we predict an 
inverted U-shaped age-litigation probability profile with a maximum 
probability in the early forties. The entire age-litigation probability 
profile shifts up slightly from 1982 to 1985.
Table 4.6 Predicted Litigation Probabilities by Age of Worker, Delaware 




























SOURCE: Predictions based on models in tables 4.3 and 4.4.
NOTE: Predicted probabilities obtained using the probit coefficients and the sample means of all
variables other than age for the 1982 and 1985 data sets, respectively.
The shape of the probability profile likely reflects systematic 
changes in the types of jobs workers have at different stages of their 
working life and the associated changes in the severity of injuries they 
suffer. For example, employees in their twenties are more likely to be 
helpers or trainees; individuals in their thirties and early forties are 
more likely to be fully trained skilled or semiskilled workers who may 
suffer more severe injuries than would their more junior colleagues. 
These more serious injuries may result in a greater probability of litiga 
tion. In contrast, older workers (beyond their early forties) are more 
likely to have supervisory jobs, where the probability of severe injury 
may be lower and, hence, the probability of litigation is lower. In our
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data, we have no information on workers' occupations; we have mea 
sures of the part of body injured and the type of injury but no measure 
of the severity of injury. It is possible that age reflects workers' occupa 
tions, which are associated with injuries of various degrees of severity: 
increasing up to the early forties, reaching a maximum, and decreasing 
thereafter.
In discussing more results from tables 4.3 and 4.4, it is helpful to 
relate these to the predictions reported in table 4.7. A case is less likely 
to be contested when the worker is a man than when the worker is a 
woman. For both years, the probability of litigation is 3.5 to 4.1 per 
centage points lower for men.
Table 4.7 Predicted Litigation Probabilities by Gender, Industry, and 


































SOURCE: Predictions based on models in table 4.3 and 4.4.
NOTE: All predictions made at the means of all variables for each sample except the variables in
the first column.
Employment in construction, manufacturing, public administration, 
and finance/insurance/real estate in 1982 (table 4.3) and in transporta 
tion, public administration, finance/insurance/real estate, and construc 
tion in 1985 (table 4.4) is associated with an increased probability of a 
case being contested. 10 Employment in the service industry serves as 
the comparison level or baseline.
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The Delaware data do not include any measure of the type of work 
performed by an injured worker other than the industry of employ 
ment. Therefore, these industry variables, as well as age, are used to 
reflect, in part, the type of work, which, in turn, may be related to the 
nature of injuries or their severity. Industry variables also reflect how 
hazardous a particular job is.
The probability of the average worker injured in 1982 and 1985 dis 
puting a case is higher in construction and manufacturing than in ser 
vices (center panel of table 4.7). The litigation probability is around 16 
to 18 percent in construction and manufacturing in both years, but it 
jumps from 10.3 to 13.4 percent from 1982 to 1985 in services. There 
was a very rapid expansion of employment in service industries in Del 
aware during this period. The growth seems to have been associated 
with a greater incidence of litigation in connection with work-related 
injuries. Manufacturing, construction, and services accounted for more 
than one-half of the injury claims in 1982 and 1985.
The part of the body injured and the type of injury are significant 
determinants of the probability of litigation. Table 4.2 contains defini 
tions for the variables representing selected parts of the body and 
nature of the injury. In both years, back, shoulder, other part, and knee 
injuries as well as multiple parts injuries significantly increase the 
probability of a case being contested. These are injuries where pain and 
the extent of the recovery following some period of recuperation are 
often difficult to ascertain objectively and are likely to give rise to dis 
putes.
The bottom panel of table 4.7 reports predicted probabilities of liti 
gation for various injuries and shows that, over time, some probabili 
ties increase while others decrease. On average, however, the litigation 
probabilities rise somewhat for these types of injuries. There was con 
siderable slack in the labor market in 1982, a recession year, while 
1985 was a year of economic expansion, with a much tighter labor 
market in Delaware. A tight labor market is associated with more over 
time work and a more intense work pace, which may result in more 
severe injuries of a given type, on average, and hence a higher average 
litigation probability.
With the 1982 data, residence in New Castle County, a predomi 
nantly urban area, significantly increased the probability of a case 
being contested, as compared to residence in Kent and Sussex Coun-
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ties, which are more rural. By 1985, county of residence had no signif 
icant effect on the probability of a case being contested. A positive 
effect would be consistent with residents of urban areas being more 
litigious than residents of rural areas and possibly facing lower costs in 
searching for a lawyer and pursuing legal actions. This effect is borne 
out for injuries occurring during the recession period of 1982 but not 
during the expansion in 1985. The dissipation of the "New Castle 
County effect" is consistent with a diffusion of information (or liti- 
giousness) from urban areas to rural areas over time so that eventually 
it makes no difference where a worker lives. The finding for 1985 is at 
least .partially a reflection of the rapid economic development taking 
place in the southern part of Delaware, especially in Sussex County 
near the resort areas.
With the 1985 data, we also find a negative and significant effect of 
the natural logarithm of the worker's real wage (in 1982 dollars) at the 
time of the injury on the probability of a case being contested. No sig 
nificant wage effect is found with the 1982 data. This pattern of results 
coincides with the increasing opportunity cost to workers of contesting 
an injury as wages rise during an economic expansion: workers try to 
return to work quickly under these circumstances. The opportunity 
costs fall during a recession, when the probability of a layoff is higher: 
workers would be much more likely to contest a case, given that return 
ing to work quickly is a less certain prospect. In addition, during the 
course of the 1980s, the U.S. economy experienced widening skill dif 
ferentials in wages (Murphy and Welch 1993). This growing diver 
gence represents a structural change in the earnings distribution 
independent of the business cycle and suggests that higher wage (and 
skilled) workers would face increasing opportunity costs associated 
with staying away from the job."
Another possible explanation of the insignificant effect of wages in 
1982 but negative effect of wages in 1985 may be that during reces 
sionary times (1982), displaced employees are likely to consider work 
ers' compensation as a possible source of income and may be more 
likely to contest a case in order to continue receiving payments. In con 
trast during a period of economic expansion (1985), workers' compen 
sation is relatively less attractive, given that prospects for earning 
wages are improving.
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Determinants of Pursuing a Litigated Case
Estimates of probit models of whether or not a litigated case is pur 
sued to verdict, as represented by equation (3.2), are reported in the 
second data column of table 4.3 (1982) and in the second data column 
of table 4.4 (1985). Cases pursued to verdict are likely to use more 
resources of the formal dispute resolution system than other cases. 
Even though our data do not contain direct monetary measures of legal 
costs, the study of the factors affecting the probability that a litigated 
case is pursued to verdict provides some insight into the use of 
resources of the legal system.
In the Delaware data sets, the probability that a case is pursued to 
verdict depends significantly on the part of the body injured and on the 
type of injury. In 1982, the significant factors included injury to the 
head, arms, back, or knee, multiple parts injuries, and other (unclassi 
fied) injuries. In 1985, back, shoulder, and multiple parts injuries sig 
nificantly increased the probability that a litigated case was pursued to 
verdict. Consistent with our earlier results, injuries (e.g., back, multiple 
injuries) from which recovery is hard to evaluate are associated with a 
higher probability of a case being contested and of being pursued to 
verdict, thus using more resources of the legal system.
Cases in which the injured worker suffered burns are significantly 
less likely to have been pursued in the 1985 data. It may well be that, in 
1985, many of these types of cases were settled before a final verdict 
was rendered; this may have resulted as new information became avail 
able to the disputing parties in the discovery phase of the dispute reso 
lution proceedings.
To give a more concrete indication of the magnitudes involved, we 
calculated predicted probabilities of a contested case being pursued to 
verdict for various injuries as of 1982 (table 4.8). Litigated cases in 
which the worker suffered a head injury have the highest probability of 
being pursued to verdict (73 percent), while the presence of injury to 
the arms, back, knee, or to multiple parts is associated with probabili 
ties that are 7.9 to 13.5 percentage points lower.
For both the 1982 and the 1985 data, we find that the probability of a 
litigated case being pursued to verdict increases with the worker's age. 
Evidence of an inverted U-shaped probability profile is weaker than 
was the case with the litigation model. Age is probably associated with
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the type of work an injured worker performed and, therefore, with the 
severity of injury. Increasing age might also be associated with general 
health or with the labor market conditions faced by a worker, which 
would tend to affect the probability that a litigated case is pursued to 
verdict.
Table 4.8 Predicted Probabilities of Pursuing a Litigated Case by Part of 
Body Injured, Delaware Data, 1982






SOURCE: Predictions based on models in tables 4.3 and 4.4.
NOTE: All predictions are made using the probit coefficient estimates in the second data column
of table 4.3 and the means of all variables except part of body injured.
In 1985, a case was significantly more likely to have been pursued to 
verdict when the employer was a major automaker. For 1982, the type 
of employer or insurance had no effect on the probability of a case 
being pursued. Our finding for the major automakers in 1985 is consis 
tent with these large, self-insured firms becoming increasingly aggres 
sive over time in pursuing contested workers' compensation cases to 
final verdict. Perhaps this is evidence that, over the period studied, the 
automakers became more concerned about precedent-setting workers' 
compensation cases and, therefore, became less willing to settle con 
tested cases before a final verdict was rendered. Recall that, in both 
years, cases in which the employer was an automaker were more likely 
to be litigated than other cases.
The fit (or explanatory power) of the pursue equations is lower than 
the fit of the contest equations, as indicated by the values of the chi- 
square statistics in table 4.3 and 4.4. However we are charting unex 
plored ground. We are unaware of any previous empirical studies of 
how far into the formal dispute resolution system a contested workers' 
compensation case is likely to go.
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Determinants of Real Compensation Payments
Up to now we have examined the determinants of whether a work 
ers' compensation case is litigated and of how far into the formal dis 
pute resolution mechanism a litigated case is pursued. We turn our 
attention to the determinants of an outcome of litigation: compensation 
paid to workers in contested cases. 12 Since most workers' compensa 
tion cases are not contested, it is important for purposes of explanation 
and prediction to compare the determinants of payments in contested 
cases to those in uncontested cases. First, we will explain our regres 
sion results in a way that closely parallels the preceding discussion of 
the estimates of the contest and pursue equations. Then, we will illus 
trate how our equations can provide predictions that enable us to evalu 
ate the efficiency of the dispute resolution system in Delaware for 
workers' compensation.
We estimated workers' compensation payment (henceforth "pay 
ment") equations for uncontested and contested cases using ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression techniques. The left-hand-side variable 
in these regression equations is the natural logarithm of the real value 
(in 1982 dollars) of the cumulative indemnity payments to injured 
workers until a case closes, or up to May 1990 for open cases. In order 
to verify the reliability of our empirical work, we tested the payment 
equations for some possible failures of the conditions under which the 
OLS regression estimates we report would be correct. We tested for 
selectivity bias using two different statistical setups. 13 We also tested 
whether the payment equations could be collapsed into fewer catego 
ries. Our statistical tests show no evidence of selectivity (for more doc 
umentation, see the appendix to this chapter). It is, therefore, 
appropriate to estimate the payment equations by the OLS method.
Characteristics of injured workers and of their employers may have 
different effects on benefit payments in contested and uncontested 
cases. For instance, the part of body (e.g., back injury) may have a dis 
tinct impact on real benefits in contested as compared to uncontested 
cases. Contested cases include instances where the parties disagree as 
to the size and/or extent of the injury. If the effects are different in these 
situations, and if benefit equations are estimated with the sample in 
which contested and uncontested cases are pooled, resulting coeffi 
cients would be misleading. Under these circumstances, the researcher
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would obtain biased estimates of, for example, the influence of back 
injuries on the level of benefits received by workers who contest their 
cases. Statistical tests were conducted to determine the appropriateness 
of pooling contested and noncontested cases as well as whether or not 
contested cases may be pooled whether they were pursued to verdict or 
not.
We found no significant difference between the payment regressions 
for contested cases pursued to verdict and for contested cases not pur 
sued to verdict. However, the payment regressions for contested and 
for uncontested cases are significantly different. 14 Consequently, we 
report estimates of payment equations for uncontested and for con 
tested cases separately. Results for contested cases are pooled into one 
equation.
As we pointed out in chapter 2, right censoring of the cumulative 
payments is unlikely to be serious for 1982 but might be more serious 
(but probably not drastically so) for the 1985 data. Consequently our 
estimates of the payment equations may have greater reliability for 
1982 than for 1985. However, to the extent that we obtain broadly sim 
ilar patterns of findings for both years, the more recent information can 
serve the useful function of confirming the results obtained with the 
earlier data.
Estimates of the payment equations are reported in tables 4.9 and 
4.10 for 1982 and 1985, respectively. The payment equation estimates 
for the sample of uncontested cases are reported in the first data col 
umn, while estimates for contested cases are reported in the second 
data column of each table.
Uncontested Cases
In 1982, cumulative payments in uncontested cases significantly 
increased, relative to commercially insured employers, when the 
employer was a self-insured chemicals manufacturer. We obtain the 
same result with a very similar coefficient estimate for 1985. This 
probably reflects the severity of workers' injuries in these cases. In the 
1982 data, cumulative payments for other employer insurance types 
are not significantly different relative to commercially insured employ 
ers. However, in the 1985 data, real cumulative payments (in 1982 dol 
lars) are significantly higher for automakers and significantly lower for 
public sector employers. The change in the effects of automakers and
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Table 4.9 Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of the Payment Equations, 
Delaware Data, 1982
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Table 4.9 Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of the Payment Equations, 
Delaware Data, 1982 (continued)
Dependent Variable: Natural Logarithm of Real Cumulative Payment
Variable





























































































NOTE: The t statistics are in parentheses.
*Denotes significance at the 10 percent level.
**Denotes significance at the 5 percent level.
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Table 4.10 Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of the Payment Equations, 
Delaware Data, 1985
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Table 4.10 Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of the Payment Equations, 
Delaware Data, 1985 (continued)
Dependent Variable: Natural Logarithm of Real Cumulative Payment
Variable





























































































NOTE: The t statistics are in parentheses.
*Denotes significance at the 10 percent level.
**Denotes significance at the 5 percent level.
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the public sector may reflect differences in injury severity over time. 
Recall that 1982 was a recession year while 1985 was not. During peri 
ods of economic expansion, automakers tend to operate their plants 
closer to capacity, using overtime employment and perhaps a more 
rapid work pace than during recessions. These conditions may be asso 
ciated with more severe injuries, when injuries occur, and higher 
cumulative payments. Among public sector employees, it may well be 
that injuries have become less severe over time. Alternatively, right 
censoring may distort the relative ranking of cumulative payments 
across different types of insurance/employers and be the source of the 
changes in results for the automakers and the public sector between the 
two years.
Cumulative payments in 1982 for uncontested cases are higher in 
New Castle County (an urban area) and Kent County (partly urban) rel 
ative to Sussex County (a predominantly rural area). This probably is a 
reflection of the type of work and severity of injuries in these cases. By 
1985, real cumulative payments were significantly higher only in Kent 
County (with a similar coefficient as in 1982) relative to Sussex 
County. During the 1980s, southern Delaware (Sussex County) experi 
enced very rapid economic development, particularly in the resort 
areas and in the service sector. New Castle County also saw very fast 
growth of employment in service industries. Economic convergence of 
these two areas has undoubtedly manifested itself in similar cumulative 
payments to injured workers in uncontested cases, which represent the 
bulk of workers' compensation cases. 15
The 1982 cumulative payments in uncontested cases increase when 
employment is in wholesale trade. This probably reflects the severity of 
injuries. Payments are also affected by body part injured and by type of 
injury. In particular, payments significantly increase for injuries to the 
knee, multiple parts, and other (unclassified) parts as well as for ampu 
tations. Payments significantly decrease for head, face, and hand inju 
ries as well as for burns and sprains. Payments in 1985 significantly 
increase for neck, arm, leg, knee, multiple parts, other part, and body 
system injuries, and for amputations. The 1985 payments significantly 
decrease for sprains, head, and jaw injuries as well as for burns. Our 
estimates of the effects of head and knee injuries as well as of the 
effects of burns are similar in 1982 and 1985. We also obtain results 
that are in the same direction but differ somewhat more in magnitude
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across the two years for amputations, multiple parts, and other part 
injuries.
The natural logarithm of the worker's (real) wage has a positive and 
significant effect on payments in uncontested cases in both 1982 and 
1985. The 1985 coefficient is about 18 percent larger than the 1982 
coefficient. The positive effect the injured worker's wage has on cumu 
lative payments is not surprising since periodic benefits are a function 
of wages (with a maximum and minimum value). However, total 
cumulative payments and a worker's weekly wage are not definition- 
ally related.
Contested Cases
We will now discuss the estimates of the payment equations for con 
tested cases, shown in the second data columns of tables 4.9 and 4.10. 
In 1982 contested cases, cumulative payments are higher when the 
employer is in the category "other private sector self-insured" and 
lower when the employer is an automaker. No significant insurance/ 
employer type effects are found for 1985. The 1982 results could well 
be measures of the severity of the particular injuries in contested cases 
that year. For 1982 contested cases, we find an inverted U-shaped rela 
tionship between age and payments. Employment in transportation 
(1982) and in wholesale trade (1985) or public administration (1985) 
significantly reduce cumulative payments.
In 1982, injuries to the neck, arms, hand, back, legs, knee, and mul 
tiple parts are associated with increased cumulative payments, while 
burns and sprains are associated with decreased payments. For 1985, 
neck, back, shoulder, knee, and multiple parts injuries as well as ampu 
tations are associated with higher payments, and burns are associated 
with lower payments. In general, the coefficients for body part and 
injury type for contested cases vary across the two years. These may 
reflect changes in injury severity across the two years; they may also 
reflect the effects of right censoring in 1985.
Although the magnitudes differ across years, several results on the 
effects of type of injury and of body part injured do go in the same 
direction in both 1982 or 1985 (i.e., are associated with increased or 
with decreased payments). Wages have a positive effect on payments in 
contested cases, as was true with uncontested cases, in both years. The 
estimated coefficient in 1985 is 74 percent higher than it is in 1982.
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The overall fit of the payment equations (for a given litigation sta 
tus) improves somewhat over time. This is probably due to increases in 
sample size. It is also notable that the fit of the contested payment 
equations (both years) is better than the fit of the uncontested payment 
equations. We suspect that the variance of unmeasured characteristics 
of workers and their employers is smaller in the payment equations of 
contested than of uncontested cases which leads to the better fit of the 
former.
Efficiency of the Delaware System
Insights can be gained about the efficiency of the Delaware work 
ers' compensation system by examining predictions associated with 
the payment equations. 16 These are presented in table 4.11. Panel A of 
table 4.11 reports predictions of natural logarithms, panel B reports 
predictions in 1982 dollars. The first potentially relevant prediction is 
of the cumulative payments going to injured workers who did not con 
test their cases. This is obtained for 1982 by plugging in the mean char 
acteristics of nonlitigants into the payment equation, based on the 
sample of nonlitigants shown in the first column of data in table 4.9. 
The predicted real cumulative payment is $922 (panel B) for a typical 
workers' compensation recipient (i.e., has average characteristics of 
nonlitigants) in 1982 who had no litigation associated with his or her 
injury. The corresponding prediction for 1985, also shown in table 
4.11, panel B, is $976.
Another prediction for 1982 involves inserting mean characteristics 
of the sample of workers who litigated their cases into the payment 
equation for this group (see the second column of table 4.9). The pre 
dicted cumulative payment in 1982 for contestants is $12,338, while 
the value for 1985 is $8,984.
There are also other predictions of interest to policy makers. Sup 
pose we wanted to know how the typical nonlitigant would have fared 
in receiving cumulative workers' compensation payments if he/she had 
litigated the case. This information obviously is not observed. How 
ever, it can be obtained by plugging the characteristics of nonlitigants 
into the equation estimated for litigants. That is, we use the coefficients 
from the total payment equation for litigants and the characteristics 
(means) of nonlitigants. In 1982, the coefficients are from the second
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column of table 4.9, and the means are those associated with nonliti- 
gants. The predicted total payments are $9,460, based on the premise 
that the typical nonlitigant in 1982 had litigated his or her case. Using 
the same procedure yields a prediction of $7,959 for 1985.
Table 4.11 Payment Predictions, Delaware Data, 1982 and 1985
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A. Predicted natural logarithms
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SOURCE: Predictions based on models in tables 4.9 and 4.10. 
a. Calculated as if litigants had not contested their cases. 
b. Calculated as if nonlitigants had contested their cases.
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On the other hand, suppose that we want to know the predicted 
value of workers' compensation benefits had litigants not litigated their 
cases. Again, this is a case not actually observed in our data. We can 
obtain the prediction by plugging the characteristics of litigants into 
the equation in which the coefficients are associated with nonlitigants 
(in 1982, the first column of table 4.9). The 1982 predicted value of 
payments is $1,042, assuming that those who actually litigated had not 
done so; for 1985, it is $1,046 (table 4.11).
Some conclusions can be drawn from these predictions. 17 First, if 
individuals who did not contest their cases had done so, the litigation 
outcome would have been 'smaller than what accrued to workers who 
actually litigated their cases. Our model also predicts that the actual lit 
igants, even had they not disputed their cases, would have received 
higher payments than workers observed not to contest their injury. This 
prediction is not only plausible but provides evidence that the dispute 
resolution system in Delaware sorts cases efficiently. The implication 
is that the cases that proceed through the litigation process, on average, 
are those that display elements associated with higher predicted com 
pensation. Suppose our model had predicted that injured workers who 
did not contest their cases would have received significantly larger pay 
ments if their cases had been contested than the sums received by 
workers who actually contested cases. Such a finding would raise the 
possibility of important inefficiencies in the dispute resolution mecha 
nism or of misspecification of the estimated model. Our results do not 
suggest either of these problems. 18
Cumulative payments for contested cases declined between 1982 
and 1985. Part of this decrease may be due to right censoring that is 
greater in the 1985 than in the 1982 data. Possibly more important, 
however, may be the willingness of injured workers to return to work 
following a shorter recuperation during an economic expansion (1985) 
than during a recession period (1982). During an economic expansion, 
wages are likely to rise faster than during a recession, and it is more 
attractive to resume work quickly in order to continue investments in 
human capital (on-the-job training), which will lead to higher future 
wages.
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Predictions about the Effect of Changes 
in Industry of Employment
Estimates of the statistical models can be used to predict what would 
happen if some exogenous characteristic changed. For example, if all 
workers had characteristics equal to the 1982 sample means of the 
regressors, we predict that (based on 1982 coefficient estimates) 13.8 
percent of workers' compensation cases in Delaware would be con 
tested. 19 If the proportion of injured employees working in manufactur 
ing declined by one-half, from 25 to 12.5 percent, and the extra 
workers were employed in services, the predicted proportion of con 
tested cases would fall to 13.0 percent (about a 6 percent decrease). 20 
The direction of the hypothetical employment changes corresponds 
closely to what is actually happening in Delaware. Major manufactur 
ers, including chemical and automotive firms, have undergone signifi 
cant downsizing. At the same time, there has been rapid growth in the 
financial and service sectors.
If the proportion of injured workers employed in construction 
declined by one-half and the extra workers were employed in services, 
the predicted proportion of contested cases would decline to 13.2 per 
cent.
Summary
In Delaware, for injuries that occurred in 1982 and 1985, a case was 
more likely to be contested if the employer was a self-insured major 
automaker; for 1985, it was less likely to be contested if the employer 
was in the public sector. An increase in the worker's wage decreased 
the probability that a case would be contested (for the 1985 data only). 
This, very likely, reflects an opportunity cost effect, which depends on 
the phase of the business cycle, and may also reflect longer-term struc 
tural changes in the economic environment.
The probability of litigation was found to rise with the worker's age 
up to a maximum (at 40 to 41 years of age) and thereafter to decline. 
This pattern may reflect injury severity, which depends on what kind of 
work an individual performs, which, in turn, depends on age. Type and
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severity of injury also affect the probability of litigation as well as the 
probability that the litigation is pursued to verdict.
We predict that if injured workers who did not contest their cases 
had done so, the litigation would have resulted in smaller indemnity 
payments than those accrued by individuals who actually contested 
their cases. This is evidence that cases are sorted efficiently by Dela 
ware's system for dispute resolution.
APPENDIX 
Tests for Selectivity Bias
To test for the possible existence of sample selectivity in the payment equa 
tions, we estimated a double selectivity model along the lines suggested by Tu- 
nali (1986). We first estimated a bivariate probit model for the probabilities 
that a case is contested and that it is pursued to verdict. The contest equation 
includes industry dummies (and a few other variables such as gender and some 
location variables), while the pursue equation does not. Thus, the contest and 
pursue equations are identified. We also tried alternative exclusion restrictions 
to identify the pursue and contest equations, and the results are generally the 
same in all of these cases. We then formed appropriate sample selectivity cor 
rection variables and estimated payment equations with these variables among 
the regressors (as well as the regressors included in the models reported in ta 
bles 4.5 and 4.6). There were three payment equations: uncontested cases (this 
equation includes one selectivity correction variable), contested cases that were 
not pursued to verdict, and contested cases that were pursued to verdict. Both 
of the last two equations include two selectivity correction variables.
The equations were estimated with the 1982 and with the 1985 Delaware da 
ta. In both cases, the estimates of the correlation coefficients of the error terms 
of the contest and pursue equations were not significantly different from zero, 
and the selectivity correction coefficients were also not significantly different 
from zero. The estimates of the selectivity correction coefficients are reported 
in appendix table 4.1. The estimates in the table indicate that the error terms of 
the contest, pursue, and payment equations may be modeled as independent.
We also estimated a simpler selectivity model along the lines of Lee (1978), 
which involves estimating only a contest equation by probit and only making 
a distinction between payment equations for contested and uncontested cases 
(i.e., collapsing the payment equations for contested cases into one equation, 
whether or not a case was pursued to verdict). Once again, the estimates do not 
indicate the presence of selectivity bias.
All of the payment equations in the models with selectivity (double or sin 
gle) rely on functional form for identification. In order to assess the sensitivity 
of our results to this identifying assumption, we also estimated alternative mod 
els in which the industry dummy variables appear in the contest equation but 
not in the payment equations. For example, one might claim that the type of in 
dustry affects the precise nature of an injury, which affects whether a case is 
contested, but that payment depends on other administrative rules, which do 
not depend on the industry of employment. We do not necessarily subscribe to 
this view, but we mention it as a possible justification of some exclusionary
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identifying restrictions. Estimating a (single) selectivity model excluding in 
dustry from the pursue equation results in estimates of the payment equation 
that are virtually indistinguishable from compared to the ones relying only on 
functional form for identification. The upshot of these tests is that the OLS re 
gression and univariate probit models underlying our study are, in fact, appro 
priate for the analysis of the determinants of litigation in the Delaware workers' 
compensation system.
Appendix Table 4.1 Estimates of the Selectivity Correction Coefficients of 
































NOTE: / statistics are in parentheses.
100 The Determinants of Litigation and Payments
NOTES
1. In both 1982 and 1985, fewer than 200 cases of this type were in the data.
2. These significance levels are arbitrary but are conventionally used in applied statistical 
work.
3. We estimated bivariate probit models. Identification of the bivariate probit model is attained 
by assuming that some regressors do not affect whether a case is pursued. The estimated correc 
tion coefficients of the error terms (t statistics in parentheses) are -0.385 (-0.883) for 1982, -0.512 
(-1.196) for 1985. In both cases, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the correlation coefficient is 
zero. This is evidence that the simple (or univariate) probit estimates reported in tables 4.3 and 4.4 
are appropriate.
4. More detail appears in the appendix to chapter 3.
5. The estimates are reliable at least with respect to this particular failure of the assumptions 
underlying the probit models.
6. The coefficient is significant at the 7.6 percent level. In other words, there is a 92.4 percent 
chance that the public sector effect for 1985 is not zero.
7. In recognition of this problem, the State of Delaware increased the wages of several catego 
ries of state employees in the late 1980s in order to compete more effectively with the private sec 
tor and to reduce state employee turnover.
8. Note, however, that some of the coefficient changes over time (e.g., for chemicals manufac 
turers) are not significant.
9. These predictions are useful in showing how the litigation probability changes as an indi 
vidual ages and has average characteristics with respect to the variables in the models.
10. Coefficients of industry variables are significant at the 7 percent level or higher in both 
years.
11. The outcome is the same as with the effect of the business cycle, but here we are referring 
to a longer-term transformation of the U.S. economy (see Murphy and Welch 1993).
12. Payments in most workers' compensation cases are received over a period of time. It is 
important, therefore, to adjust for inflation when comparing awards. We converted the awards into 
real (1982) dollars as follows: using the worker's wage, we calculated the weekly benefit. The 
number of weeks of total disability was found by dividing the total disability payments as of 1990 
by the weekly benefit entitlement. We assumed that total disability payments started at the begin 
ning of the disability period and were received in consecutive weeks until benefits were 
exhausted. We then applied the appropriate Consumer Price Index (CPI) for all urban consumers 
for each year to deflate the benefits received. If payments for disfigurement, temporary partial, or 
permanent injuries were involved, the total workers' compensation payment was greater than the 
sum of the total disability payments that accrued by mid-1990. We treated other types of payments 
(partial disability, permanent, or disfigurement) as lump sums and assumed that they were paid 
two years after the date of disability. In reality, some of these were received before or after two 
years. Our source at the Delaware IAB, however, said that our assumption was reasonable in most 
cases.
Our method of allocating total disability payments over time ignores periods during which an 
injured worker recovers, returns to work (and benefits cease) but is reinjured or has a relapse of 
the injury, and once more receives benefits. We have no information on the duration and timing of 
such interruptions, so our method is likely to result in some underadjustment for inflation. Fortu 
nately, the period from 1982 to 1990, during which most of the cases were closed, was a time of 
low inflation (average annual CPI increase of about 3.7 percent), so the possible underadjustment 
is unlikely to be drastic.
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13. Selection bias may arise from unobserved characteristics affecting the probability that a 
case is contested or pursued, which may be correlated with the error term of the payment equa 
tions. First, we estimated a switching regression model with double selection, consisting of an 
equation on whether or not a case was contested and an equation on whether or not the case was 
pursued to verdict (conditional on the case being contested). We specified these equations to have 
error terms that are jointly normally distributed and estimated this bivariate probit model for each 
Delaware data set. After forming the appropriate sample selectivity correction terms, we esti 
mated three payment equations: uncontested cases, contested cases not pursued to verdict, and 
contested cases pursued to verdict. Each of the two payment equations for contested cases 
includes two selectivity correction variables, while the equation for uncontested cases includes 
one selectivity correction variable in addition to all the regressors included in the contest equation.
14. The F statistics test the hypothesis that the payment equations are identical for contested 
and uncontested cases; they are F (33, 3885) = 48.18 for 1982 and F(33, 4262) = 39.99 for 1985. 
In both data sets, we reject the hypothesis of equality of the payment regressions at the 1 percent 
significance level.
15. The 1985 results may be affected by right censoring of the cumulative payments data.
16. In table 4.11, panel A, we report payment predictions in natural logarithms and their stan 
dard errors (the standard errors indicate that the payments are significantly different across cate 
gories). These are translated into dollars, reported in panel B, by a Taylor series expansion 
(extension of the method in Goldberger 1964, pp. 217-18). We include third and fourth moments 
in order to increase the accuracy of the retransformation.
17. The low standard errors of the predictions in table 4.11, panel A, suggest a high degree of 
confidence that our predictions are different across categories.
18. We remind the reader that we have no information about the details of cases judged to be 
not compensable. Therefore, we make no claims about the efficiency or lack thereof of the dispute 
resolution system in Delaware as it relates to noncompensable cases.
19. The actual proportion is 16 percent. The discrepancy arises from making the prediction at 
the (1982) means of all regressors rather than averaging the predictions at the values of each 
observation. This is inessential for our purposes; we only wish to obtain a baseline prediction and 
study changes in it in response to assumed changes in the values of regressors.
20. We assume that the employers were not the major automakers or chemicals firms.

Determinants of Litigation
Michigan Closed Case Study
The empirical model of workers' compensation litigation estimated 
for Delaware will be of greater policy relevance if it is applicable to 
other states. Fortunately, we were able to obtain data from the W. E. 
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research that relate to the litigation 
process for the Michigan workers' compensation system in 1986. This 
is particularly relevant for comparison purposes since the period is 
very close to the 1982 and 1985 time frame of our Delaware data.
Our discussion will first focus on the Michigan data, including the 
purpose for the development of this information. Next, we will high 
light the key features of the litigation process and litigants in Michigan. 
Third, econometric models specifying the determinants of litigation 
and the determinants of the complexity of the litigated cases are esti 
mated and results presented. Finally, there will be a discussion of con 
clusions along with their implications for policy.
The Michigan Data
Our discussions in this chapter relating to the litigation process in 
Michigan draw heavily on the unpublished report, "Intrastate Differ 
ences in Workers' Compensation Costs, October 1986 Closed Case 
Study" by Allan Hunt and Leslie Lance (1989). Our empirical esti 
mates of the determinants of litigation are based on data collected for 
Hunt and Lance by the Michigan Bureau of Workers' Disability Com 
pensation. 1
As in Delaware, policymakers in Michigan have often been faced 
with the task of evaluating and reforming workers' compensation in 
the absence of empirical information that would allow an objective 
evaluation of the system. The major goal of Hunt and Lance was to 
provide information about the operation of the Michigan workers' 
compensation system as it existed in 1986 so as to give legislators facts
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on which to base future policy recommendations. More specifically, 
they wanted to shed light on how the system in Michigan operated in 
1986 as compared to 1978, the last time there had been a systematic 
study (Hunt 1982). Information on the operation of the system in 1986 
and its outcomes, along with comparisons with the 1978 system, pro 
vided legislators with the requisite information to evaluate the effec 
tiveness of the reforms in Michigan workers' compensation instituted 
in the early 1980s.
The information used by Hunt and Lance was extracted from a data 
base of more than 655,000 cases developed and maintained by the 
Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensation of the Michigan Depart 
ment of Labor. The sample included 6,265 workers' compensation 
cases closed in October of 1986. Closed cases are defined as those that 
have no administrative action pending and no payments currently tak 
ing place. In particular, a case is closed when the individual claimant 
has recuperated and returned to work; has recuperated but not returned 
to work; has accepted a lump-sum payment along with an agreement 
not to seek further compensation; has withdrawn the claim or had ben 
efits denied in an administrative procedure, and thus is no longer eligi 
ble for benefits; or has died (Hunt and Lance 1989, p. 3).
The closed case sample design of Hunt and Lance is different from 
the approach we chose for Delaware. In the latter, we selected all cases 
opened in 1982 and 1985 and then followed each case for eight and 
five years, respectively. As Hunt and Lance point out, a major advan 
tage of the closed case data design is that the researcher knows what 
has happened in each case, since it has gone through a complete cycle, 
a beginning and an ending. 2 A disadvantage of this approach occurs in 
cases that are heavily litigated and date back several years. Serious 
long-term claims are systematically underrepresented in closed case 
data sets. Their frequency is reduced by virtue of the fact that employ 
ment and workers' compensation claims have been growing over time. 
In addition, since the entitlement to benefits in such cases occurred 
under a much earlier policy regime, there may be little or no relevance 
to the current workers' compensation system. Finally, an advantage of 
the closed case sample for 1986 arises because Hunt's previous study 
of the 1978 system (prior to reforms of the early 1980s) was based on a 
closed case sample design, making it appropriate for comparisons of 
the pre- and postreform period in Michigan (Hunt 1982).
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Key Variables
The 1986 file of closed cases for Michigan workers' compensation 
is a rich source of information. Using this resource, we now highlight 
important characteristics of the litigated cases. The first point to 
emphasize is that most workers' compensation cases in Michigan, as in 
Delaware, are uneventful. Namely, the worker is injured, with prompt 
acknowledgment from the employer, and then payment of benefits is 
made by the insurer (i.e., the party responsible for liability). Of 6,265 
cases, 5,488, or 87.6 percent, were unlitigated. As in Delaware, litiga 
tion occurs when an employer, employee, or the insurance carrier dis 
agree on some aspect of the claim. Litigation occurred in 777 or 12.4 
percent of the 6,265 cases (Hunt and Lance, 1989, p. 9). This is slightly 
below the 16 percent figure we report for Delaware in 1982 and 1985 
in table 2.3.
We treat the individual case as the unit of observation. In order to 
make meaningful comparisons with the Delaware results for factors 
affecting litigation, we constructed two dependent variables: one 
reflecting whether or not a case is litigated at all and another to pick up 
what we referred to in the Delaware data as "pursued" cases. Litigated 
cases may involve one or more petitions and events. Whether the case 
has one or thirty events in the dispute resolution process, it is consid 
ered litigated. In our work on Delaware, we defined a case as "pur 
sued" if it included at least one sequence of legal events that ended in 
an award of benefits, mailing of a payment, or an administrative hear 
ing. The last category could include, but is not limited to, such activi 
ties as a hearing before the workers' compensation board, a superior 
court hearing, or a supreme court hearing. More complex cases might 
include multiples of these and other legal events (see the chapter 2 dis 
cussion).
A variable (case type) Hunt and Lance refer to as "case complexity" 
provided the information for constructing the variables "litigate/not lit 
igate" and "pursue." Although the complexity variable is not defined in 
exactly the same manner as the variable we constructed for Delaware, 
it should provide information similar to the Delaware "pursue" vari 
able. 3 The intent of the pursue variable is to measure how deep into the 
legal system a case progresses. Pursued cases use more resources of
106 Determinants of Litigation
the workers' compensation and legal systems. Thus, understanding the 
determinants of whether or not a case is pursued provides information 
leading to resource-saving system changes.
The least complex category of the litigated cases in Michigan con 
sists of situations where only an employee petition for a hearing was 
included. Hunt and Lance denote this classification as "contested"; it 
included only 10 observations. Another type of case used in Michigan 
is called a "redemption." These are closed cases and involve a lump- 
sum payment to the claimant in exchange for freeing the employer 
from future liability in the case. The "redemption" category included a 
total of 348 cases. The third type of case included those having a "deci 
sion" form filed, with or without the forms associated with the previ 
ously mentioned case types. These decisions are rendered by workers' 
compensation magistrates who write orders enforceable under the law. 
This "decision category" included 343 cases. The final classification 
involves cases where the forms for an appeal are part of the record, 
whether or not forms are included relating to any of the other types of 
cases. "Appealed" cases comprised 76 of the litigated cases. In the fol 
lowing statistical analysis, we define cases that involve decisions or 
appeals as being pursued to a verdict.
We now discuss the variables that will appear as determinants of the 
litigation of a case or of its being pursued to a verdict. Insurer types are 
segmented into two major categories: commercial insurers and self- 
insured. Hunt and Lance further divided self-insured firms by singling 
out the Big Three automakers "because of their economic importance 
in the Michigan economy and because of the widespread impression 
that they handle workers' compensation cases differently than other 
employers in the state" (Hunt and Lance 1989, p. 29). In our statistical 
analysis, we used the Hunt and Lance breakdown as the starting point 
for classifying employer/insurer types associated with each claim. 
These categories include the Big Three automakers, other self-insured, 
commercial carriers, and multiple types of insurance. Within other 
self-insured are small organizations in a common industry that contrib 
ute to a group self-insurance fund. For instance, a group of hardware 
stores across the state may contribute to a group fund. These group 
arrangements are probably more similar to those associated with a 
commercial insurance carrier than with a self-insured employer; as a 
result, we separated out "group" from the self-insured category. Group
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insured included 556 claims, 9 percent of the sample of 6,265. We also 
created a category for public sector self-insured (e.g., City of Detroit) 
because of the belief that cost minimization (or profit maximization) 
incentives will be weaker for public sector entities as compared to pri 
vate sector firms. In summary, categorical dummy variables were con 
structed to represent the Big Three automakers; other self-insured 
private employers, excluding group insured; group insured; self- 
insured public employers; commercial carriers; and multiple types.
The potential importance of the type of insurer as a determinant of 
whether a case is litigated is also shown by a cross tabulation of litiga 
tion status by insurer type. As table 5.1 indicates, claims involving Big 
Three firms are three times more likely to have a case litigated than are 
the typical claims associated with "other self-insured" employers and 
have more than twice the likelihood of claims associated with firms 
insured by a commercial carrier. Cases in which employers are insured 
by commercial carriers are more likely to be litigated than cases in 
which employers are self-insured (see Hunt and Lance 1989, p.61; 
reproduced here as table 5.1); this result is confirmed in our multivari- 
ate analysis of the Michigan data discussed later in the chapter. In 
chapter 4, for the Delaware data, we found no difference in the litiga 
tion probability between cases in which the employer was commer 
cially insured or was self-insured and in the private sector (other than 
the major automakers). Economic theory does provide a plausible 
explanation of why the results in Delaware are different from those in 
Michigan.
Where a claim originates within Michigan is potentially important 
as a determinant of litigation, since workers' compensation magistrates 
who hear cases in different regions have discretion that can lead to dif 
ferent administrative practices across the state. Moreover, practices of 
the local bar association are likely to vary by location within Michigan 
(Hunt and Lance 1989, p. 23). We categorized the Standard Metropoli 
tan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) of the state into Detroit Metropolitan, 
Ann Arbor-Jackson, Flint-Saginaw, Grand Rapids-Muskegon, Kalama- 
zoo-Battle Creek, Lansing-East Lansing, and finally, other areas. The 
data show that location of claim may play an important role in the liti 
gation process. For example, the Detroit metropolitan area accounts for 
about 50 percent of workers' compensation claims, but it is responsible
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for over 67 percent of the litigated cases in the sample of 6,265 (Hunt 
and Lance 1989, p. 52).

































































SOURCE: Hunt and Lance (1989, p. 61).
It should be noted that location and type of insurer may be interact 
ing to yield the results for Detroit. Insurers categorized as Big Three 
automakers are concentrated in the Detroit, Flint-Saginaw, and Lan- 
sing-East Lansing areas of Michigan. Thus, the greater incidence of lit 
igation in these places may be due to location and/or type of insurance 
carrier. Other self-insured carriers are more evenly distributed through 
out Michigan (Hunt and Lance 1989, p. 53).
Another interesting result relates to the differential outcomes of liti 
gation by region of the state. "Washouts," cases not compensated, com 
prise only 4.5 percent of the total Michigan sample of 6,265 but 6.6 
percent of the total for Detroit. Almost three-fourths of all washouts in 
the sample occurred in Detroit, leading Hunt and Lance to suggest that 
this could reflect less credible claims occurring there (Hunt and Lance 
1989, pp. 55-56). It should be emphasized that the Delaware data
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underlying chapter 4 do not include washouts. The workers' compen 
sation system in Delaware only collects information on compensable 
cases. In order to check for the effects of noncompensable cases on our 
results, we estimated models that include and that exclude washouts.
Determinants of Litigation: A Multivariate Model
Researchers have more confidence in results obtained from statisti 
cal models when conclusions from alternative data sets are similar. 
When data sets produce dissimilar conclusions, the observed differ 
ences must be explained. To find out if this is the case for our Delaware 
results relating to the determinants of litigation, we reestimated equa 
tions (3.1) and (3.2), the contest and pursue equations from chapter 3, 
with the 1986 Michigan closed case data.
There are major differences between the Michigan and Delaware 
data. The Michigan data set is based on a closed case design, using 
cases closed in 1986. The Delaware data consist of two files, one 
including all cases where the date of injury was 1982, and the other 
comprising cases originating with a 1985 injury. For all intents and 
purposes, the Delaware laws governing workers' compensation did not 
change following 1982 through the end of the period we analyzed, 
May 1990. The Michigan closed case file includes cases originating 
prior to the reforms of the early 1980s. Inclusion of such cases may 
lead to misleading observations regarding the outcome of reforms.
Several variables found to be important determinants of contesting a 
case in Delaware were not available at all, or when available, contained 
large amounts of missing data for persons litigating their cases. The 
Michigan data do not include any information about the nature of the 
injury or part of the body affected, variables found to be major factors 
in the Delaware litigation. The industry in which the injury occurred is 
not available in the Michigan data except for claims involving the Big 
Three automakers. Also, there are substantial numbers of missing 
observations for the gender and earnings variables in more than half of 
the litigated cases in the Michigan data. To avoid possible selectivity 
bias, which may result if we use only Michigan observations in which 
the workers' gender and wage are reported, we'do not use these vari-
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ables. We caution the reader, therefore, that the regression results 
obtained for Michigan may be affected by the absence of information 
on several worker and employer characteristics found to be important 
in our analysis of the Delaware data. In spite of these limitations, the 
Michigan data are useful in estimating some of the models developed 
earlier for Delaware and make it possible to compare results for the 
two states.
The Delaware Industrial Accident Board retains complete data only 
on cases that are compensable. Data collected by the Michigan Bureau 
of Workers' Disability Compensation include both compensable and 
noncompensable cases. Also, as noted, the 1986 closed case Michigan 
data include injury cases that began prior to the reforms in the early 
1980s. In order to make the samples of the two states as comparable as 
possible, we estimate the contest (i.e., litigate or not litigate) equation 
under several assumptions about the samples. Table 5.2 shows the 
means and standard deviations for the samples of all cases (compen 
sated and noncompensated) and "compensated cases" only that opened 
after 1969. Similar statistics are shown in table 5.3 for cases occurring 
after 1981. The key point is that the means of the variables are similar 
in both tables irrespective of the time period or whether or not the case 
was compensable.
The post-1969 total and compensated-only sample sizes are 6,198 
and 5,926, respectively. For cases after 1981, the total and compen 
sated-only samples include 5,951 and 5,724 observations, respectively. 
The sample including all cases originating after 1969 yields a litigation 
rate of 12.3 percent, while the compensated-only sample had 8.9 per 
cent of cases litigated. The litigation rates for cases after 1981 for the 
total and compensated-only samples were 9.7 percent and 6.8 percent, 
respectively. The lower litigation rates on the more recently originated 
cases are not surprising since cases that settle in a shorter time frame 
are less likely to be of the complex variety. Note that litigation rates fall 
when noncompensated cases are dropped from both the post-1969 and 
post-1981 samples.
It is helpful to compare the characteristics of workers' compensation 
claimants from the Michigan sample with those of claimants from Del 
aware. Means and standard deviations for the variables employed in 
the analyses are shown in tables 5.2 and 5.3 for the Michigan data and 
in table 4.1 for the Delaware data. The average age of Delaware claim-
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ants is slightly lower, between 33 and 34, compared to 36 for Michi 
gan.
Table 5.2 Means and Standard Deviations of the Variables (Based on 
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Table 5.3 Means and Standard Deviations of the Variables (Based on 
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Michigan has a much larger representation of self-insured employ 
ers (including those from both the public and private sectors), equal to 
more than 40 percent of the sample, compared to between 20 and 25 
percent for Delaware (see table 4.1). If employers covered under group 
insurance are excluded from the self-insured category because they are 
more likely to act like commercial carriers, the percentage of self- 
insured in Michigan is still greater than 30 percent. Moreover, fully 36 
percent of the cases in Michigan involved private self-insured carriers,
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while the figure is only 7 percent in Delaware. The 36 percent figure 
declines to 27 percent if "group" is excluded from the private self- 
insured classification.
Due to limitations in the Michigan data, we were unable to estimate 
all of the equations as we did for the Delaware data. 4 We were able, 
however, to estimate the determinants of whether a case was litigated 
and the determinants of case complexity. Because the results are very 
similar for two time periods, 1970-1986 and 1982-1986, results in this 
chapter are based on the samples including injuries after 1969. The 
determinants of whether or not a case is litigated are shown in table 
5.4, the predicted litigation probabilities by type of insurance are in 
table 5.5, and the determinants of whether a case is pursued are pre 
sented in table 5.6. Equations based on the samples comprised of inju 
ries after 1981 can be found in appendix tables 5.1 and 5.2. The 
equations are specified as probit equations, where the first column of 
equation estimates always refers to the sample including compensated 
and not compensated cases, while the second column is based on the 
sample of compensated cases. First, we will examine the determinants 
of litigation, the contest equations.
Type of Insurer and Litigation Rates
Insurance type produces very different results in Michigan vis-a-vis 
Delaware. The models estimated for Delaware indicated that claims 
occurring in private sector self-insured firms other than the major auto- 
makers were no more likely to be litigated than similar cases in which 
the firm had insurance from a traditional commercial carrier (tables 4.3 
and 4.4). As just noted, the one exception was that cases involving the 
major automakers were more likely to be litigated.
Results for the determinants of litigation for all cases originating 
after 1969 are shown in table 5.4. Commercially insured employers 
comprise the omitted group and are used as the basis for comparison. 
The coefficient for the Big Three automakers was positive and signifi 
cant when both (compensated and uncompensated) cases were 
included in the sample (first column of data). Although still positive, 
the coefficient was not statistically significant when the sample was 
limited to compensated cases (second column). This result is consistent 
with the argument that litigation surrounding Big Three cases is more
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Table 5.4 Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Contest Equation
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NOTE: The t statistics are in parentheses.
*Denotes significance at the 10 percent level.
**Denotes significance at the 5 percent level.
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heavily involved with finding out whether or not a case is compens- 
able. Among those claims ultimately found to be compensable, Big 
Three cases were not significantly more likely to be litigated than cases 
associated with commercial insurers.
Workers' compensation cases involving other categories of self- 
insured firms in 1986 were less likely to be litigated than cases involv 
ing firms covered through commercial insurance carriers. This is dem 
onstrated by negative and statistically significant coefficients on the 
variables indicating claims associated with other self-insured private 
sector firms, group-insured private sector firms, and public sector self- 
insured employers.
To see more clearly the effect of type of insurance on the probability 
of litigation, we calculated predicted litigation probabilities (with all 
variables except insurance type at the sample mean values) for various 
categories of insurance (table 5.5). The predicted litigation probability 
for the Big Three automakers (all cases) is 78 percent higher than that 
for commercially insured firms, but it is about 2.5 to 3.5 times higher 
than those for the other types of insurance. The predicted litigation 
probability for cases with a commercially insured employer is 1.5 
times the probability for cases with a self-insured private employer 
other than one of the Big Three automakers, but it is about twice the lit 
igation probability for private group-insured or public self-insured 
employers. Finally, the predicted litigation probability for cases involv 
ing Big Three automakers is very different in the samples including 
and excluding washouts: 21.6 percent and 11.1 percent, respectively.
Cases in Michigan in which the employer is commercially insured 
and in the private sector are more likely to be contested than other 
cases, except for the major automakers (table 5.4). However, in Dela 
ware, cases in which the employer is commercially insured are no 
more likely to be contested as cases in which the employer is a self- 
insured firm in the private sector, except for the major automakers 
(tables 4.3 and 4.4). A plausible explanation of this difference arises 
from the way prices for commercial workers' compensation insurance 
are regulated in the two states: Delaware imposes a price floor on 
insurance premiums, while Michigan does not.
Insurance premiums in Michigan were regulated prior to the early 
1980s, but beginning in 1981, a series of reforms ultimately led to open 
competition among insurance companies in the pricing of workers'
116 Determinants of Litigation
compensation. Hunt, Krueger, and Burton (1988) document a signifi 
cant reduction in insurance premiums during the 1982 to 1985 period 
as a result of the removal of the price floor that had been in effect prior 
to 1982. Insurance companies in Michigan are free to compete with 
each other on price, while insurance companies in Delaware cannot 
offer discounts to employers with above-average safety records within 
a class of employers engaged in the same line of business. 5
Table 5.5 Predicted Litigation Probabilities by Type of Insurance, 
Michigan Data, 1986
Employer/insurer Percent
Big Three automaker, all cases 21.6
Big Three automaker, compensated cases 11.1
Commercial insurance, all cases 12.1
Other private sector, self-insured, all cases 8.1
Group insurance, all cases 6.0
Public sector, self-insured, all cases 6.4
SOURCE: Predictions obtained using the model in table 5.4.
NOTE: In making these predictions, all variables other than insurance type are set to their sam 
ple mean values.
In effect, the rate regulation in Delaware results in very safe work 
places subsidizing less safe workplaces. This incomplete experience 
rating of workers' compensation insurance policies may well explain 
the apparent difference in behavior of insurers in Delaware relative to 
those in Michigan. Insurers in Michigan appear to charge premiums 
that are closely related to employers' claims experience.
In order to shed light on reasons for the discrepancies between the 
1986 Michigan findings and those for Delaware obtained in chapter 4, 
it is informative to mention some results obtained by Allan Hunt in his 
study of the Michigan workers' compensation system as it existed in 
1978 (Hunt 1982, p. 89). Hunt employed a closed case sample that 
included compensated and uncompensated cases. Using a linear proba 
bility model, where the dependent variable is equal to one if a case is 
litigated and is equal to zero otherwise, Hunt found a statistically sig 
nificant and positive coefficient on the variable indicating that a worker 
was the employee of one of the Big Three automakers. Thus, our
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results with regard to the Big Three are identical to those found by 
Hunt. The coefficient of the variable designating "all other self- 
insured" firms revealed a negative and statistically significant relation 
ship with the probability of litigation, again similar to our findings for 
1986.
In summary, and relating to 1978, Hunt found a significantly higher 
probability of litigation for a workers' compensation case involving a 
Big Three automaker than for a comparable case in which the firm was 
covered by a traditional commercial carrier. Conversely, a case in 
which an injured worker was employed by any other firm categorized 
as self-insured was less likely to have involved litigation. Thus, Hunt's 
earlier results on other self-insured firms differ from the corresponding 
results we have obtained for Delaware. We are not sure why the effect 
of (other) self-insurance was different in Michigan in 1978 than in Del 
aware in 1982 or 1985. One may speculate that, even though Michigan 
insurers operated with a premium price floor in 1978, premiums in 
Michigan might have been more completely experience rated in 1978 
than were premiums in Delaware in 1982 or 1985.
Competition also forces insurers to pursue, on the margin, question 
able claims more vigorously than in Delaware. In Delaware, regulation 
results in incomplete experience rating, which lessens the competitive 
pressure on insurers to pursue some questionable cases. Of course, all 
insurers would, other things being equal, challenge questionable 
claims, but doing so is a costly activity. Given a sufficient implicit sub 
sidy of less safe workplaces by safer workplaces, which is induced by 
rate regulation, it may well be that insurers will not contest some cases 
that would be contested in a more competitive rate environment.
A useful analogy can be made with the operation of the unemploy 
ment insurance system. In most states, unemployment compensation is 
financed by taxes on employers, and these taxes are incompletely expe 
rience rated. Typically, employers face declining marginal tax rates on 
layoffs beyond certain levels. Usually, for layoffs up to a threshold, 
each dollar in unemployment compensation paid to workers results in a 
dollar in taxes collected from the employer. For layoffs beyond the 
threshold, however, an extra dollar in benefits paid to workers results in 
an additional tax of less than a dollar on the employer. In effect, large 
employers, once they have laid off a certain number of workers, receive 
a subsidy for additional layoffs, financed by taxes on smaller employ-
118 Determinants of Litigation
ers or by general tax revenue. It is well documented (e.g., Feldstein, 
1976 and Topel 1983) that when a large firm experiences a temporary 
reduction in demand for its product, it is more likely to lay off workers 
than to retain them producing less than their contribution to the value 
of the firm's output; this occurs because the system of financing unem 
ployment compensation essentially subsidizes layoffs by large employ 
ers. Incomplete experience rating makes laying off a worker 
advantageous to the firm, on the margin, relative to keeping the worker 
on the job but temporarily "underemployed."
In an analogous manner, workers' compensation insurers will, in 
general, contest questionable claims. However, the incomplete experi 
ence rating of insurance premiums will raise the threshold of expected 
benefits required for litigation to occur, lowering the probability that an 
insurer will contest a case. Hunt, Krueger, and Burton (1988) sug 
gested that when Michigan lifted price floors from workers' compensa 
tion policy premiums in the early 1980s, this would very likely lead to 
increased competition, forcing insurers to contest questionable cases 
more vigorously than before in an attempt to reduce their costs.
Another analogy may be made with the escalation of costs in the 
U.S. health care system in recent years. One explanation of this accel 
eration is that the full tax deductibility of health insurance premiums 
for firms takes away some of the incentive of employers and individu 
als to demand that insurance companies and health care providers con 
trol costs. Absent such pressure, insurance companies pass on 
increases in providers' fees to employers, who then deduct the insur 
ance premiums from their gross income as a business expense. Without 
tax deductibility, one could argue that employers and individuals 
would insist that insurance companies require providers to moderate 
price increases.
Our estimates for Michigan are very similar to those obtained by 
Hunt (1982), who argues persuasively that his model is correctly speci 
fied. There may also be other institutional differences between the Del 
aware and Michigan situations, which we are unable to control for and 
which may account for the discrepancies in our estimates across the 
two states. Keeping this caveat in mind, however, we propose the pre 
ceding arguments as an economic explanation of the differences 
between Delaware and Michigan in the behavior of commercial insur 
ers.
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In conclusion, open competition in pricing has resulted in insurance 
companies pursuing questionable cases more vigorously than was true 
when there was a floor on workers' compensation insurance premiums. 
Thus, the negative coefficient estimate on the private self-insured vari 
able (table 5.4) is not surprising.
Other Variables Affecting Litigation Rates
The probability of a case being litigated in Michigan is not signifi 
cantly affected by a worker's age. For Delaware, we found increasing 
probabilities of litigation up to age 40 (1982 data) or 41 (1985 data) 
and decreasing probabilities thereafter. Differences in results could 
partly be caused by the sample designs (common opening date versus 
closed case) and partly by the omission of relevant variables such as 
type of injury, body part injured, industry, gender, and wage from the 
contest equation for Michigan in 1986.
The region variables have the expected effect, with workers' com 
pensation cases in the Detroit metropolitan area much more likely to be 
litigated compared to most other areas in the state (table 5.4). However, 
cases were also more likely to be litigated in the Ann Arbor-Jackson 
metropolitan area. The probability of litigation in a typical case in Ann 
Arbor and in Detroit, evaluated at the means of all other variables, is 
16.7 and 15.1 percent, respectively, while the probability of litigation 
for nonmetropolitan areas is 7.1 percent.
Determinants of Case Complexity
The next question involves the complexity of litigated cases in 
Michigan. As a case type goes from contest and/or redemption to deci 
sion and/or appeal, the case absorbs ever more state resources. In our 
probit regression models, we estimated the effect of employer and 
injured worker characteristics on the probability of whether or not a 
case has been taken to a decision or an appeal. The independent vari 
ables are the same as in the models of the determinants of litigation. 
Parameter estimates are reported in table 5.6 for cases that originated 
after 1969. Results based on cases starting in 1982 through 1986 are 
found in appendix table 5.2.
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Table 5.6 Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Pursue Equation (Based 








Other self-insured private sector
Self-insured public sector












































































NOTE: The t statistics are in parentheses.
*Denotes significance at the 10 percent level.
**Denotes significance at the 5 percent level.
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Many of the estimated coefficients are very similar for the "all 
cases" and the "compensated cases" samples. Age of the injured 
worker is not an important factor influencing whether or not a con 
tested case is pursued through the litigation process when washouts are 
included in the sample. However, for the sample including only cases 
deemed compensable, the incidence of pursuing a case rises with age, 
reaches a peak at age 36, and declines thereafter. A similar pattern for 
the probability of pursuing a case is evident with the Delaware data, 
but with a higher age at which the probability reaches a maximum. For 
Delaware, the greatest probability is reached at age 47 (1982) and age 
48 (1985). The differences between Delaware and Michigan in the age 
at which the highest probability of pursuing a case occurs likely reflect 
variations in the occupational distribution of the workforces in the two 
states.
The coefficient of the Big Three automaker variable is positive and 
statistically significant, which indicates that these cases are more 
likely, if contested, to be pursued through the workers' compensation 
litigation process. For the sample of all cases, the model predicts that 
the probability of pursuing a contested case associated with a Big 
Three related injury is 72.3 percent, while that for a commercial carrier 
is 42.5 percent. The bottom line is that cases in which the employer is 
one of the major automakers are both more likely to be contested and, 
given that litigation has taken place, more likely to go further into the 
workers' compensation litigation process. We found a similar result for 
Delaware for 1985. Even though claims involving other self-insured 
employers, both private and public, are less likely to be litigated, when 
they are, the probability that the case will be pursued to a decision or 
appealed is the same as that of a commercial carrier. This is indicated 
by the insignificant coefficient of the variables reflecting other self- 
insured employers. Cases in which the employer is covered by com 
mercial carriers are more likely to be litigated but equally likely to be 
pursued, perhaps because commercial insurance carriers have more 
resources than other firms and can bring about a mutually agreeable 
settlement of the issue(s) in the dispute.
The location in the state where the injury occurred is also an impor 
tant factor: Detroit, Flint-Saginaw, and Lansing-East Lansing were 
most likely to have litigated claims pressed beyond the initial stages of 
the litigation process. Predicted probabilities of pursuing a case (for the
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sample of all cases) are reported in table 5.7 for various areas of Mich 
igan. Such probabilities are 1.5 to 2.0 times higher in metropolitan than 
in nonmetropolitan areas.
Table 5.7 Predicted Probabilities of Pursuing a Litigated Case by 











SOURCE: Predictions obtained using the model in table 5.6.
Summary
In Michigan, cases in which the employer is a Big Three automaker 
or is commercially insured and in the private sector are more likely to 
be contested than other cases (table 5.5). For Delaware, we found, 
instead, that cases in which the employer is self-insured and in the pri 
vate sector are equally likely to be contested as other cases. This differ 
ence arises from the ways commercial workers' compensation 
insurance prices are regulated in the two states: Delaware imposes a 
price floor on insurance premiums while Michigan does not. As a 
result, there is less competitive pressure in Delaware than in Michigan 
to challenge questionable claims.
For Michigan, we documented increasing probabilities that a case is 
pursued to verdict when the employer is one of the Big Three automak- 
ers or has multiple types of insurance. For compensated cases, the 
probability that a case is pursued increases with a worker's age up to a 
maximum, and decreases thereafter. This is a qualitatively similar age- 
related pattern to that in Delaware. Injury claims in which the 
employer operates in the Detroit, Flint-Saginaw, and the Lansing-East 
Lansing metropolitan areas, other factors held equal, are more likely to 
be pursued to verdict than in nonmetropolitan areas.
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Appendix Table 5.1 Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Contest
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NOTE: The / statistics are in parentheses.
*Denotes significance at the 10 percent level.
**Denotes significance at the 5 percent level.
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Appendix Table 5.2 Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Pursue
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NOTE: The / statistics are in parentheses.
*Denotes significance at the 10 percent level.
**Denotes significance at the 5 percent level.
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NOTES
1. See Hunt (1982) as well as Hunt and Lance (1989) for details surrounding issues that we 
discussed for Delaware in chapter 2.
2. Our time frame was sufficient for Delaware, such that very few cases were still open by 
mid-1990, the ending point for the Delaware data.
3. Details on the construction of the Hunt and Lance variables appear in the following para 
graphs.
4. With the Michigan data, it is not possible to determine in which year a worker received a 
payment; therefore, it is difficult to convert cumulative payments into real values for estimation of 
payment equations. The longer time period covered by these data and the fact that many cases 
were open in the late 1970s or early 1980s, when inflation was high by historical standards, make 
application of the deflation method we used for Delaware problematic.
5. Delaware authorizes an independent rating bureau to compile and publish insurance rates, 
to which commercial carriers must adhere in pricing their product. The various components of an 
employer's insurance premium are calculated according to these rates. All insurance companies 




We have studied the determinants of the probability of litigation 
and of the probability that a contested workers' compensation case is 
pursued to verdict. Very little is known about this area, and our empiri 
cal work presents new evidence with data from Delaware and Michi 
gan. With the Delaware data, we have also studied the determinants of 
indemnity payments to injured workers in contested (litigated) and in 
uncontested workers' compensation cases.
We found that regulation of commercial insurance pricing for work 
ers' compensation has an important impact on the probability of litiga 
tion: a price floor on insurance premiums (as in Delaware) tends to 
reduce the litigation probability. Conversely, competitive pricing of 
commercial insurance (as in Michigan) tends to increase the litigation 
probability, as insurers have a greater incentive to contest questionable 
cases. We found some evidence in Delaware that cases involving a 
self-insured employer in the public sector have tended to be contested 
less frequently over time. In both states, cases in which the employer is 
one of the major automakers are more likely to be contested than cases 
involving other types of employers and (over time) have tended to be 
more likely to be pursued to verdict rather than being settled. The 
major automakers may have pursued questionable cases with increas 
ing aggressiveness in order to control future liability arising from pre 
cedent-setting situations.
The part of the body injured and the type of injury affect both the lit 
igation probability and the probability that a contested case is pursued 
to verdict, as evidenced by the Delaware data. Injuries that are difficult 
to evaluate objectively, such as back injuries or multiple injuries, 
increase the probability that a contested case is pursued to verdict.
The industry of employment (Delaware) and the age of the injured 
worker (in Delaware) affect the probability of litigation. Both industry 
and age most likely reflect the severity of injury suffered by workers. 
Employment in manufacturing or construction tends to increase the lit 
igation probability, while employment in services tends to decrease 
this probability. Therefore, redistribution of employment away from
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manufacturing or construction and towards services should result in 
lower litigation rates. A shift of employment in this direction has been 
occurring in Delaware and in the U.S. labor market as a whole over the 
past decade. Our model for Delaware predicts that the movement of 
jobs from manufacturing and construction to services, within the range 
of the experience of the past few years, will reduce litigation rates.
Both the probability of litigation and the probability that a contested 
case is pursued to verdict increase with a worker's age up to a maxi 
mum value and decrease thereafter. A similar pattern is observed in 
Delaware and Michigan. The implication of our finding is that a rise in 
the average age of the workforce, which will take place over the com 
ing decades, will tend initially to increase litigation rates and the rates 
at which litigated cases are pursued to verdict. However, continued 
increases in the average age will eventually tend to lower both rates.
Cumulative real indemnity payments to injured workers depend on a 
worker's wage, age, type of injury, part of body injured, and location. 
The payment equations we estimated for Delaware permit us to predict 
the amounts injured workers in uncontested cases would have received 
if the cases had been contested. We also predict the payments for con 
tested cases as if these cases had not been contested. We conclude that, 
for cases judged to be compensable, the dispute resolution system for 
workers' compensation in Delaware sorts cases efficiently.
The two states whose workers' compensation systems we have stud 
ied have fundamentally different underlying principles: payment in 
Delaware depends on the degree of impairment while, in Michigan, it 
depends on wage loss. What is the effect of this difference on litiga 
tion? In general, an approach to workers' compensation that requires 
subjective (nonmarket) evaluation of impairment (Delaware's 
approach) will be more litigious than one that is based on actual wage 
loss (that is, where payment is a fraction of the difference between the 
old wage and the best new wage obtained after the injury). Delaware 
bases compensation on proxies for the expected wage loss assessed ex 
ante, before the wage loss actually occurs. Michigan pays on the basis 
of lost wages.
Litigation should be predictable in an impairment state: the greater 
the difficulty or uncertainty in estimating impairment, the more likely 
the litigation. We would not expect the same sort of pattern in a wage- 
loss state, particularly if one omits the lump-sum settlement cases. In
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fact, the empirical results for Delaware show the anticipated predict 
ability of litigation frequency with respect to type of injury or body 
part injured as a result of the system's reliance on the impairment 
approach.
Consequently, we should see generally higher litigation probabili 
ties in Delaware relative to Michigan. It follows that overall efficiency 
is compromised in Delaware, because the system introduces friction 
that would not be necessary if a pure wage-loss approach were used in 
the compensation process. That is, why estimate the expected wage 
loss, subject to error, when the actual wage loss can be observed? Of 
course, the wage-loss approach is likely to have its own problems, and 
moral hazard is one of them.
However, as discussed in chapter 5, the methods of setting insurance 
premium rates in the two states differ dramatically and with precisely 
the opposite impacts on litigation. Delaware's rate-regulated environ 
ment discourages litigation. Michigan's open competition encourages 
insurance carriers to challenge claims aggressively so that cost savings 
can be passed along in the form of lower premiums. As a result, no 
clear net empirical prediction is possible for the combined influences 
of the fundamental compensation principle and the insurance premium 
pricing mechanism. The effects of differing compensation approaches 
are exactly the reverse of the effects of the rate-setting environment.
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